

Partial Reading List and Reflections

February – April 2019

Lawrence C. Chin

19 February

Read the Spanish translation of Houston A. Baker's introduction to Frederick Douglass' (Spanish translation) *Vida de un esclavo americano, escrita por él mismo*.

25 February

Reading Peter Zarrow's *Anarchism and Chinese Political Culture*.

27 February

Reading mostly Gotelind Müller's *China, Kropotkin...* and Frederick Douglass' *The Life of Frederick Douglass, An American Slave* (intro. David Blight) along with its Spanish translation.

References in Gotelind Müller (*China, Kropotkin...*). Zhang Zhidong (張之洞), "Chinese knowledge as the essence and Western knowledge for application". After the Sino-Japanese war, the interest also in institutional reform (p. 136). Liang's negative evaluation of anarchism (p. 145). Chinese translation of the Japanese translation of Thomas Kirkup's *A History of Socialism* (about the Russian movements): how the translator changes the author's negative evaluation of anarchism into positive endorsement. Somewhat the same thing with the translation of Kotoku Shusui's *Introduction to Socialism* (自由血, p. 147). Then again with the translation of Kemuriyama's *Modern Anarchism* (the first part was about the Russians) in 1904 (p. 154). The inspiration of Sof'ja Perovskaja (p. 155). Kutsumi Kesson's *Anarchism* (1906), the second book on anarchism in Japan. Many references to studies on Liu Shipei on p. 166.

2 March

This is how Chinese anarchism fits into its greater context. The context is that of progressive learning from the West until the maximum extent possible. During the Self-Strengthening movement (1865 – 1895), China should learn only superior technology and industrial techniques from the West (hence Zhang Zhidong's motto "Chinese knowledge as the essence and Western knowledge for application"). Li Hongzhang and Zeng Guofan were representative of this period. After the Sino-Japanese War, it became clear that West's, and Japan's, success consisted more than in superior technology but also in superior institutions and that China must learn also political system and social sciences from the West (i.e. the superior methods in organizing society and mobilizing population). Hence the 100 Days Reform of 1898. Kang Youwei, Tan Sitong, and Liang Qichao were representative of this new trend. After the failure of the Reform, the Chinese students in Japan began actively absorbing Western political philosophies and social sciences. Including Liang Qichao in Japan. The purpose was to learn new methods of governing society and organizing population in order to strengthen the nation. Western learning now expanded from technology and industrial techniques to natural, social, and political sciences. Up until now, the purpose of Western learning remained the strengthening of the Chinese nation. From 1903 onward, the Chinese students in Japan began learning something that was

considered “disturbing” in the West: socialism, anarchism, and communism. The radicals in the West (socialists, nihilists, anarchists, and communists) were not engaging in their business for the sake of strengthening their nation but in order to achieve social justice (liberate the proletariat and women from bourgeois and patriarchal oppression). In the West, they were regarded by the governing authorities as destructive elements that must be suppressed rather than as talents and assets that might help increase the strength of the nation. At first, the Chinese students, stupid, passed off Western radicalism as if it were something like social contract, republicanism, and constitutionalism that might also help strengthen China. When Chinese anarchists like Liu Shiwei (劉師培) and He Zhen (何震) came on the scene in 1907, however, they had more adequately absorbed socialism and anarchism: for them, revolution was not for the purpose of strengthening China but in order to achieve social justice, even as part of a world-wide revolution. (Müller’s comment that Liu’s interest was in world revolution, p. 199.) By this time, Western learning had expanded from technology and natural, social, and political sciences to include even protest movements and rebellions that were in fashion in Western societies. Western learning had reached its maximum and completion with Chinese anarchism and, later, communism.

There were thus two types of revolutionaries among Chinese students and expatriates: (1) to absorb Western technology, sciences, and political methods in order to strengthen China. To this type belonged Liang Qichao, Chen Duxiu, and Sun Yatsen’s Tongmenghui (同盟會). (2) To learn Western radicalism in order to achieve social justice in China and in the world (or as part of a “world revolution”). Strengthening and saving China was not the issue here. To this type belonged Liu Shiwei and He Zhen. Liu Shiwei’s fundamentally different notion of “revolution” might have contributed to his becoming disillusioned with Tongmenghui and betraying them to the Manchus. (See especially Müller’s comment about Liu’s excitement over Tolstoy’s advice to the Chinese, p. 194: Liu’s antagonism to Tongmenghui was motivated by his different goal for China in the revolution business.)

He Zhen’s different conception of what revolution was about might also explain her greater radicalism than the other Chinese revolutionaries and her different sort of feminism from the typical Chinese “male feminism”. Namely, that she wanted the liberation of women for women’s own sake rather than simply in order to strengthen the nation. The two types of Chinese feminism corresponded to the two types of Chinese revolutionaries.

Dirlik (*Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution*) has explained that the new conception of space among Chinese intellectuals opened up by the encounter with the West (also explained in Tang Xiaobing’s *Global Space* and Rebecca Karl’s *Staging the World*) created the conceptual possibility not only for a revolution to create and strengthen the Chinese nation-state, but also for a revolution in China that was only part of a global revolution. The nationalist revolution (early Liang Qichao, early Chen Duxiu, Tongmenghui) corresponds to the former possibility whereas the universalist revolution (Liu Shiwei and He Zhen) to the latter. Those interested in the nationalist revolution exemplify Jouvenel’s revolutionaries: i.e. it’s not so much that they loved liberty as that they hated weakness (they hated the Manchus not because the Manchus were tyrants but because the Manchus were weak vis-à-vis foreigners). When they talked about liberty and equality and justice, it’s merely a means to an end, a means to the greater power of the state. They remind me of Machiavelli, who praised republics and the free people found in them not because he loved freedom but because this is an expression of strength (the free people of a republic are so strong as to be able to defend themselves against foreign invaders).¹ They were “revolutionaries” only in the sense that Giuseppe Mazzini was a “revolutionary”.

1 See Chapter 2 of Book II of Machiavelli’s *Discourse on Livy* (“What peoples the Romans had to combat, and that they obstinately defended their freedom”; trans. Mansfield).

Meanwhile, those that were interested in a universalist revolution wanted liberty and equality and justice for their own sake and so were “true revolutionaries” (in the sense that Marx or Kropotkin were “revolutionaries”). They did not hate weakness nor were they obsessed with national strength and they consequently were not very interested in any sort of anti-Manchu racism. It’s inevitable that the two sides would come into conflict, as Liu Shiwei came into conflict with Tongmenghui.

Because China was under threat of extinction, it is no wonder that so many young people opted for the revolution of the nationalist type while Liu Shiwei and He Zhen constituted a mere minority. In Japan and the West, because their nations were doing well (were imperialist powers), the revolutionaries were predominantly the second type. They (whether Kotoku Shusui or European and American anarchists) hated their governments not because the governments were weak but because the governments perpetuated oppression and injustice.

4 March

Listened to NPR’s broadcast about Lana Lokteff, “The Women Behind the ‘Alt-Right’” (20.08.2017). Also about Lokteff in Seyward Darby, “The Rise of the Valkyries”, *Harper*, 09.2017.

Matters in regard to which Frederick Douglass directly contradicts Fogel’s conclusions (says the exact opposite): (1) that slaveholders were quite frequently brutal and cruel people, that they physically punished their slaves quite frequently, and that they frequently did not give their slaves enough to eat; (2) that slaves frequently physically resisted their masters (Douglass even fought one of his masters); (3) that he had thought that people in the North must be poor since they possessed no slaves (that richness could only have come from slaveholding; p. 114). In reality, the North was rich! Even free blacks were richer than slaveholders (p. 115)! A typical working man in the North was wealthier and more cultivated than the typical slaveholders in the South. (The case of Mr Nathan Johnson, p. 115.) Free labor makes society richer and more moral. Douglass is here professing the abolitionist idea that slavery harms the slaveholders themselves as well as their slaves. (4) But Douglass professes this idea in two senses: material and moral. When he professes this in the moral sense (that slaveholding degrades the slaveholder’s moral character; such as in the case of Mrs Sophia Auld who first taught Douglass how to read) he does not quite contradict Fogel’s conclusion: Fogel is only talking about harm in the material sense (that slavery has retarded the South’s economic development and made southerners poor). Douglass’ other points: (1) the yearning for freedom is the result of the intellect’s being awakened, especially by reading and thinking. (2) Christianity has been distorted into its opposite in the South in order to serve to protect slavery, making Southern religious people hypocrites *par excellence*.

7 March

Received, and began reading: 萬仕國, 劉禾; 天義·衡報 (*Natural Justice and Equity*).

The 5 German-speaking intellectuals who concur with my political orientation (Putinverstehers or leftist conservative): Nobert Häring (Frankfurt), Rainer Rothfuß (Tübingen), Daniele Ganser, Hannes Hofbauer, and Thomas Röper (Anti-Spiegel, St. Petersburg).

Listened to Lana Lokteff a lot lately. Remember: we support rightwing anti-immigration campaign in Europe because this will disrupt Bilderberg’s plan (perhaps force them to change their plan) – despite

our understanding that the rightwing people have never really understood why the elites want to “replace whites with immigrant color people”.

8 March

The three possible goals of revolution: (1) social justice (for its own sake); (2) national liberation from foreign (Manchu) occupation; and (3) national strengthening. While Liu and He represent (1), the nationalists along the line of Sun Yatsen and Chen Duxiu represent both (2) and (3). Meanwhile, Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, and Yen Fu, because they favor constitutional monarchy, want only (3).

Sun’s goals: overthrowing Manchu and strengthening China so that China may become equal to the imperial powers. Such is the definition of a “nationalist” (a “nationalist revolutionary”). Social justice (rights granted to citizens, lands equalized, etc.) is minimal enough to “modernize”, i.e. to strengthen, the state. What’s more important is justice between nations: the way of humanity (人道; Schiffrin, *Sun Yat-sen*, p. 143). Hence, nationalism and Pan-Asianism.

While both Liu/ He and Sun (or Kang and Liang for that matter) wanted liberation from Western imperialism, their motivation was fundamentally different. Sun was motivated by national identity: Chinese must be equal to the imperialist powers. Liu/ He were motivated by justice for the weak and downtrodden: the strong must not be allowed to exploit/ dominate the weak. They interpreted the world through different categories (national identity vs injustice), lived in different universes, and wanted different things in life.

For Liu and He, social justice means “equality”. Their fundamental thesis is that communism is the best means for social justice. For He, the purpose of feminism was women’s equality with men (so that the world may belong to both men and women: “The Question of Women’s Liberation”: 使世界為男女共有之世界, *Natural Justice*, p. 133).

The fight for social justice is part of world revolution: Liu and He see themselves in the company of all the revolutionaries in the West and Japan working toward the same goal (world utopia). Hence the purpose of *Natural Justice*: 破除國界種界，實行世界主義 (p. 3). And against the strong’s oppression of the weak anywhere in the world: 抵抗世界一切之強權 (ibid.). Hence communism and gender equality (ibid.). Unlike the nationalist revolutionaries, He and Zhen were merely an extension of the world revolution into China.

In the West, radicalism started off with republicanism (first the Jacobins during the French Revolution and then the “liberals” who wanted universal male suffrage and the constitution during the revolutions of 1832 and 1848) and continued into socialism, anarchism, and communism. The later ones were more radical than the earlier ones. Originally, both the republicans and the socialists were aiming only for liberty and justice, without thinking much about whether the liberty and justice they wanted could contribute to the power of their nation. However, history has shown that, when one’s idea about fighting for liberty and justice and so on is implemented, i.e., incorporated into the actual social and economic system, it is often made to perform another function which one has never intended. By 1898, the time of Hundred Days Reform, all Western nations were either republics or constitutional monarchies: i.e. constitutionalism and republicanism – universal male suffrage, a parliament, and a constitution to limit the power of either the monarch or the executive branch – were already *fait accompli*, leaving only socialism waiting to be realized. While the original intent of suffrage,

parliament, and constitution was the liberty of the masses – however much the socialists might think it was all chimera or only liberty for the bourgeoisie – the *real* function they were made to perform was the stabilization of the government and better mobilization of the population to contribute to national strength. When Chinese reformers (Kang Youwei’s school) looked into Western (constitutional) institutions after the Sino-Japanese War, they were more interested in the “national functions” which “liberty” was made to perform than in “liberty” itself. “Liberty” was a means to an end. Then the nationalist revolutionaries (Sun Yatsen/ Chen Duxiu) may be likened to the republican “liberals” of 1832 and 1848 since they wanted a republic (“democracy”). They wanted republican liberalism as a means to another end, the increase of national strength.² The “true” revolutionaries like Liu and He stood in relation to them as the socialists stood in relation to the constitutionalists and republicans in Europe: the *more* radical vis-à-vis the *less* radical. But, because socialism, anarchism, and communism were not yet *fait accompli* in Europe, they had not yet been made to perform another function (the power of the nation-state) than that for which they were originally intended (social justice) – only later did Stalin and Mao try to bend communism into performing the function of strengthening the nation-state. Consequently, the “true” revolutionaries” like Liu and He remained *pure in heart*: they *truly* wanted a world revolution to achieve justice for the poor masses and women and detested any corruption of this ideal by ulterior considerations about strengthening the nation-state.

One must remember that when constitutionalism and republicanism first emerged in England and France, it was considered “radical”. (Constitutional monarchy may be considered a compromise between republicanism and *ancien regime*.) During the 1848 revolution, the “liberals” (who wanted a republic or, if that couldn’t be, at least a constitutional monarchy) were considered “radicals” whose “liberal” ideas the monarchies all over Europe wished to suppress. By 1898, however, constitutionalism and republicanism had become mainstream in Europe. There might be quarrel between constitutional

2 For example, John King Fairbank (*China: A New History*): “The list of desirable reforms had been steadily growing since the Opium War. Several secretaries and advisors of Li Hongzhang had contributed; so had Christian missionaries, Taiping rebels, diplomats who went abroad, and early Chinese journalists in Hong Kong and Shanghai. For such people the Western countries and now Japan offered a cornucopia of new ways that might be adapted to China’s needs. On the broadest level, *parliaments could create a firmer bond between ruler and people*. Government patents or rewards could encourage inventions, repair of roads could help trade, mineralogy could improve mining, agricultural schools could increase production, translations could broaden education – the list was endless...” (emphasis added, p. 227.) Again: “When Japan’s constitutional monarchy defeated Russia’s tsarist autocracy in 1905, constitutionalism seemed to have proved its efficacy as a basis for *unity between rulers and ruled in a national effort*. Even Russia now moved in 1905 toward parliamentary government. Constitutionalism in China, it was hoped, if combined with government reorganization to strengthen the central administrative power, might give the rising provincial interests a meaningful share in the government and so keep them loyal to it...” (emphasis added, p. 244). Namely, the Chinese’ emphasis was on the practical (*firmer bond, unity*) than on the idealistic aspects of parliamentary system (*liberty*). Fairbank continues on the Qing’s constitutional reform: “Under the pressure of rising nationalistic sentiment, the court sent two official missions in the first half of 1906 to study constitutionalism abroad. One visited mainly the United States and Germany; the other, Japan, England, and France. Japan’s Prince Ito lectured the visitors on the necessity of the emperor’s retaining supreme power, not letting it fall into the hands of the people. On their return they recommended following this Japanese view, *that a constitution and civil liberties including ‘public discussion,’ all granted by the emperor, could actually strengthen his position because he would remain above them all*. In September 1906 the Empress Dowager promised a ‘constitutional polity’ after due preparation. Further missions visited Japan and Germany in 1907–1908” (p. 245). Harold Schiffrin also emphasizes that Empress Dowager’s court’s sudden decision to adopt constitutionalism – precisely what they had rejected during the Hundred Days Reform – was motivated by their desire to re-establish centralization now that the loss of control over the provincial gentry was made all the more apparent during the Boxers’ Rebellion (*Sun Yat-Sen*, p. 345). Namely, the Qing court was interested in the practical *use* of the “liberty of the people”, i.e., the greater efficacy of the central authority, rather than in this “liberty” itself. The nationalist revolutionaries (Sun Yatsen’s crowd) were also mainly interested in the representative government’s ability to strengthen the nation-state when they wanted a revolution that was national, republican, and social at the same time.

monarchists and republicans (e.g. Bismarck hated republicanism), but nobody disputed that a constitution and a parliament were necessary components of a modern nation. Thus Chinese reformers like Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao or the Manchu court after 1901 were free to explore the constitution and the parliament for the “other function” which they were made to perform in the West. Socialism (and its variants, anarchism and communism) may be regarded as a further radicalization of republican ideals. While republicanism can be dated to the last years of the *ancien regime* (e.g. Montesquieu), the further radicalization called “socialism” first emerged during the French Revolution (e.g. Gracchus Babeuf and the Conspiracy of the Equals) and continued under the shadow of republicanism (e.g. Louis August Blanqui). “Radicalism” may be defined as incorporating the excluded masses into the *politea* – until everyone was included. Thus, during the French Revolution, the bourgeoisie (the Third Estate: the lawyers, merchants, professionals) wanted inclusion in the running of the state. This republicanism is “radical” in the era of the *ancien regime*. Then socialism is more radical than republicanism in that (1) it reaches into the proletariat whom the bourgeoisie had neglected and (2) the inclusion is here deemed to be economic as well as political (hence the reform of the economic structure of society as well as the nation’s political structure to enable the workers to not only participate in the running of the state but also in the ownership of the means of production). By 1898, socialism had not yet become mainstream – it is only after WWII that one of its variants, “social democracy”, becomes mainstream in Europe. The conflict between Liu Shipei/ He Zhen and Tongmenghui somewhat corresponds to the cleavage between the socialists and the republicans in Europe,³ while the dispute between Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, and Yen Fu on the one hand and Sun Yatsen and Chen Duxiu on the other somewhat corresponds to the quarrel between the constitutional monarchists and the republicans.

Instances where Liu and He spoke against nationalist revolutionaries: (1) disgust with the latter’s anti-Manchu racism; (2) disgust with the latter’s blind and unconditional admiration for the West and Japan.

(1) Disgust with anti-Manchu racism

(“Advertisement for Society for the Study of Socialism”, p. 606): 雖有志之士，間倡民族主義，然僅辯種族之異同，不復計民生之休戚... The nationalists did not simply envision national liberation from foreign occupation (Manchu rule) like Mazzini did. They hated the Manchu because the Manchu were weak, and national strengthening therefore required liberation from Manchu rule. However, He seems to talk as if the nationalists were motivated solely by racism. On the one hand, because Liu and He were internationalists, they were naturally disgusted with the nationalists’ anti-Manchu racism. On the other hand, Liu and He seem as if, because they envision revolution’s goal as social justice, they are opposed to national liberation of the Mazzini type. They emphasize that social injustice could continue under the rule of one’s own people. They attack (2) without mentioning whether they are opposed to (3) as well.

In “Women’s Revenge” (女子復仇論, p. 49), He dares to assert that men are women’s enemies – comparable to American radical feminists 60 years later. The nationalists who wanted improvement of women’s conditions in order to strengthen the nation could not have thought likewise because women’s liberation was for them only a means to an end. Only when women’s liberation was envisioned as an

3 This dispute is today reflected in America in the cleavage between the left (the “liberals”) who want “socialism” and the “conservatives” who want the *laissez-faire* republicanism that was first established during the Founding.

end in itself can it become possible to envision class antagonism between men and women. Hence He's different conception about revolution made her more radical in her feminism.

Here, because He wanted justice for women for women's own sake, she again criticized the futility of overthrowing the Manchu and changing to rule by one's own people: the Han people were even more patriarchal than the Manchu (然吾則以為漢族之君，其禍更甚於異族之君; p. 49). Women revolutionaries that followed the nationalist men were "unenlightened" (p. 49). Again, an attack on (2) without mentioning (3). Conclusion: (1) 故異族為君，其命當革，即漢族為君，其命亦當革 (p. 50). (2) Even constitutional monarchy and republican governments must be overthrown as well as long as they are run by men and as long as there is the distinction between the ruling and the ruled (ibid.)

(2) Criticizing the West and Japan and disgust with blind admiration for the West and Japan

The nationalist revolutionaries, because their goal was national strengthening, not only wanted to overthrow Manchu rule, but also admired the West blindly and unconditionally. He, because she only cared about social justice, was frequently critical of the West as well – in agreement with Western revolutionaries (suffragists, socialists, anarchists). Hence, in "Women's Manifesto" (p. 41), her lament that, despite monogamy, women in the West could not participate in politics and voting and so were not equal to men after all (p. 41). In "Women's Anti-militarism" (p. 183) He again points out that the masses were poor in Japan and the West and denounces the nationalists for blindly admiring the West and wanting only national strengthening (p. 184).

11 March

The beginning of the thesis. (1) A classification of Chinese revolutionaries (from the most conservative to the most radical): (a) constitutional monarchists (立憲派: Kang Youwei, (early and later) Liang Qichao, Yen Fu); (b) republicans (革命派: Sun Yatsen; but also early Chen Duxiu in a separate group); (c) socialists/ anarchists (Liu Shipei and He Zhen).

(2) How this corresponds to the *process* of radicalization in Europe. (a) Constitutional monarchy emerged first. (Although the Glorious Revolution of 1688 did not result in a constitution, the liberties that were granted, the independence of the judiciary, and the ascendancy of the House of Commons approximated to a constitutional monarchy.⁴ Then the French Revolution started off as a movement for constitutional monarchy, and it was only later that the monarchy was abolished and a republic proclaimed. In 1871 Bismarck allowed a constitutional monarchy to be established but would not tolerate the dominance of the parliament characteristic of a republic. (b) The republic first emerged in France during the French Revolution in 1792. This was more radical than constitutional monarchy so that the French Revolution was denounced by monarchies all over Europe. (c) The emergence of socialism/ anarchism/ and communism within the womb of republicanism (from Babeuf and Blanqui to Fourier and Saint Simon).

How the classification corresponds to the *logic* of the radicalization: the parliament and the constitution were first introduced into the *ancien regime*. Such was the constitutional monarchy. When the monarch was removed and replaced with an elected executive, this became a republic: republicanism. When

4 Professor Robert Blackburn, in "Britain's unwritten constitution" (<https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/britains-unwritten-constitution>), explains how, unlike most modern states, Britain does not have a codified constitution but an unwritten one formed of Acts of Parliament, court judgments and conventions.

even the power structure of a republic was abolished and all properties were held in common to enable the entire masses to participate in the polity and own the means of production, this was socialism/ anarchism/ communism.

(3) The process of “mainstreaming” of radical movements in Europe. (a) When a radical idea first gained currency, it was widely feared and suppressed by existing government authorities. And so republicanism was despised by monarchies all over Europe during the 1848 revolution, and socialism and anarchism by constitutional monarchies and republics from 1870 onward. (b) Then followed the phase of “mainstreaming”, where the idea became widely accepted and soon made to perform another function than that for which it was originally intended.

Before “mainstreaming”, revolutionaries were genuine as such. The “liberals” who wanted a constitution or a republic during the 1848 revolution wanted so because they loved liberty. After “mainstreaming”, revolutionaries were not genuine. Kang Youwei during 1898 and the Qing court after 1901 wanted a constitution because they saw in it an effective mechanism to increase the state’s power or strengthen the central government’s hold on its territories rather than because they loved liberty. Sun Yatsen and (early) Chen Duxiu also wanted a republic not because they loved liberty but because they loved strength – the strength of the nation along with the strength of the people. Now, because Liu Shipei and He Zhen wanted anarchism and communism before these were “mainstreamed” anywhere in the world, they were genuine revolutionaries: they wanted so because they loved equality rather than because they loved strength or centralization.

The Chinese constitutionalists and republicans wanted the strength of people: the strength of the nation would be increased when mature citizens replaced the slavish “subjects”. (Günter Wollstein: “Diese Kräfte der Bewegung sprachen vom Anbruch eines bürgerlichen Zeitalters, in dem mündige Staatsbürger obrigkeitstaatliche Untertanen ersetzen sollten.”)⁵

Gotelind Müller: Wu spoke of Liu Shipei’s original mission to split the revolution in *Xin Shiji* (p. 230). Also, Chu’s objections to Sun’s Three People’s Principles, emphasizing the importance of social change and the inclusion of the proletariat (ibid.). Liu Shifu on the need to abolish marriage, advocating free love (p. 290). His engagement in life-style experiment (p. 293).

12 March

Shiffrin: Sun’s Japanese collaborators: Miyazaki Torazo (Toten: 宮崎滔天) and Hirayama Shu (平山周).

14 March

Draft statement of research problem, question, issue, and methodology.

I propose to use a new concept “mainstreaming of revolution” to analyze the cause of the schism occurring within the Chinese radical/ revolutionary movement, in particular the break of anarchists Liu Shipei/ He Zhen (the “Tokyo Group”) with the Tongmenghui, with passing comments on the conflict between Liang Qichao and Sun Yatsen.

5 “Von der Paulskirche bis zur Verfassung von 1871” (<http://www.bpb.de/geschichte/deutsche-geschichte/grundgesetz-und-parlamentarischer-rat/39184/1848-1871?p=all>).

Numerous commentators (Dirlik, Zarrow, and Gotelind Müller) have mentioned the distinction between the two types of Chinese revolutionaries: the nationalists who wanted revolution to create a strong and rich China, and the anarchists who wanted revolution to establish social justice in China. The former wanted a national revolution whereas the latter sought revolution in China only as part of a worldwide revolution leading up to a universal utopia. These commentators have used this difference to explain the schism within the Chinese revolutionary movement; Müller in particular uses this difference to explain why Liu Shipei and He Zhen betrayed Tongmenghui to the Manchus in 1908. My plan is to use the concept of “mainstreaming” to achieve a deeper understanding of the difference between these two types of revolutionaries and, in particular, of the schism between Liu/ He and Tongmenghui.

(1) The analysis shall begin by explaining the concept “mainstreaming”. “Mainstreaming” is meant to describe the typical life-cycle of a racial/ revolutionary idea. In the West, “radicalism” started off with constitutionalism and republicanism (to either introduce constitution, parliament, and civil liberties into the *ancien regime* or to set up a republic to replace monarchy altogether) and then evolved into socialism, anarchism, and communism. (The “lesser radicals” and the “greater radicals”.) Originally, both the constitutionalists/ republicans and the socialists were aiming solely only for liberty and justice, without thinking much about the implications of the liberty and justice they wanted for their nation as a whole. The long history of Europe from 1789 to 1871 during which constitutionalism and republicanism were being implemented was characterized by the radicals’ (the “liberals”) demanding civil liberties for the masses and the monarchs’ reluctance to grant them. While gaining traction, the radicals were often violently suppressed by the monarchs. By 1871, however, constitutionalism and republicanism were the norm in Western Europe: all states in Western Europe were either constitutional monarchies or republics. The ideals of the “lesser radicals” (constitutionalism and republicanism) had been “mainstreamed” and there was now a consensus that a constitution and a parliament along with civil liberties and the division of power were necessary components of any modern nation-state. But it is seen throughout history that, when one’s radical idea has become “mainstreamed”, i.e., incorporated into the actual social and economic system, it is often made to perform another function which one has never intended. Once “mainstreamed”, constitutionalism and republicanism served the function of integrating/ centralizing the nation-state and increasing its power. For the outsiders, it was this mainstreaming of the radical idea which was attractive rather than the radical idea itself. The mainstreaming of constitutionalism and republicanism was the starting point of the Chinese radical/ revolutionary movement. Thus, after 1895, when Chinese reformers (Kang Youwei’s school) looked into Western institutions wanting to learn the secret of the power of Western nations and Japan, they were more interested in the greater power which the constitutional mechanism may impart on the state than in the idea of “liberty” itself. Thus the drive for a constitutional monarchy during the Hundred Days Reform of 1898. “Mainstreaming” is also the cause of Qing’s drive for constitutional reform in 1905: Empress Dowager’s court’s sudden decision to adopt constitutionalism – precisely what they had rejected during the Hundred Days Reform – was motivated by their desire to re-establish central authority now that the loss of control over the provincial gentry was made all the more apparent by the Boxers’ Rebellion. Again, it is the *national function* (“centralization”) which the idea of “liberty” had been made to perform after mainstreaming which was the basis of the Chinese reform movements, the first sparks of the Chinese radical/ revolutionary movement.

(2) I shall then propose a simple classification of Chinese radicals/ revolutionaries (from the less radical to the most radical) that correlates with their Western originals: (a) constitutional monarchists

(Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, and Yen Fu); (b) republicans (Sun Yatsen; but also (early) Chen Duxiu in a separate attempt); (c) socialists/ anarchists (Liu Shiwei and He Zhen in Tokyo and the others in Paris).

This classification corresponds to both the *process* and the *logic* of radicalization in Europe, the source of Chinese revolution. In Europe, constitutional monarchy emerged first, the republic a little later, while socialism/ anarchism/ communism, emerging a little later than republicanism, had not yet become reality by the time of 1895, when Chinese radical movement (reform and revolution) began in earnest. In terms of the *logic* of radicalization: the parliament and the constitution were first introduced into the *ancien regime*. Such was the constitutional monarchy. When the monarch was removed and replaced with an elected executive, this became a republic: republicanism. When even the power structure of a republic was abolished and all properties were held in common to enable the entire masses to participate in the polity and own the means of production, this was socialism/ anarchism/ communism.

(3) I shall then point out how the concept of “mainstreaming” can enable us to see a sharp division, among Chinese radicals, between the constitutional monarchists and republicans (Liang Qichao, Sun Yatsen, and early Chen Duxiu) on the one hand and the anarchists (Liu Shiwei and He Zhen in particular) on the other. Namely, the constitutional monarchists and republicans were “post-mainstreaming” revolutionaries, attracted to the mainstreaming of revolutionary ideas rather than to the ideas themselves, while the anarchists were “pre-mainstreaming” revolutionaries, attracted to the revolutionary ideas themselves rather than to their mainstreaming. The former group was attracted to the idea of a constitution or a republic because the history of Europe, America, and Japan had demonstrated that a nation with a constitutional or a republican mechanism can better mobilize its population to contribute to the power of the state – they really wanted power (mainstreaming) rather than liberty (the original idea) – while the latter group had no interest in the power of the state (mainstreaming) but cared only about the original idea (here it is “justice” rather than “liberty”).

The problem here is that, because socialism, anarchism, and communism were at this time still waiting to be realized, they had never had the chance of becoming mainstreamed. It was only later that Stalin and Mao would try to bend communism into performing the *other* function of strengthening the nation-state (when the idea of communism was made to perform another function than the original intention of liberating the proletariat from oppression (justice)). The Chinese constitutional monarchists and republicans – the nationalist revolutionaries – wanted civil liberties *as a means to another end*, the increase of national strength. These post-mainstreaming revolutionaries were not “genuine” in the sense that they were not devoted to the revolutionary ideals for their own sake. Liu and He (and the Paris Group as well) were on the other hand *pure in heart*: they *truly* wanted a world revolution to achieve justice for the poor masses (and women) and detested any corruption of this ideal by ulterior considerations about strengthening the nation-state.

In this sense, the conflict between Kang/ Liang (the constitutionalists) and Sun (the republicans) was not as deep as that between Sun and Liu. As post-mainstreaming revolutionaries, the former pair (both nationalists) agreed in the *goal* of the revolution (national-strengthening) and disputed only about the *means* (either adding a constitution to the existing monarchy or removing the monarchy altogether so as to be able to erect a republic on a clean slate), whereas the latter pair (nationalists vs anarchists) disputed about the very goal itself. Within this analytical framework, Liu and He’s critical remarks about Sun’s enterprise – that the latter had disregarded the plight of the suffering masses – acquire greater intelligibility. Liu and He’s attempt to relate to their European and Japanese counterparts in a

world revolution scheme also becomes more intelligible: Liu and He had not betrayed the original goal of revolution as it was then conceived in Europe and America.

Implicit in the concept of “mainstreaming” is the definition of “radicalism” in general: “radicalism” means the liberation of the poor and powerless many from the oppression of the rich and powerful few. This liberation is the content of the concepts “liberty” (for the republicans) and “justice” (for the socialists). The “liberals” (the republicans in Europe) were less radical because they wanted the liberation of the merchants and the professionals (the bourgeoisie) from the aristocrats while the socialists (and the anarchists and communists) were more radical because they wanted the liberation of the workers and peasants who were even below the bourgeoisie. In the Chinese context: by distorting the liberal ideals into mechanism of national strengthening, the post-mainstreaming revolutionaries (nationalist revolutionaries) were, in the eyes of the pre-mainstreaming revolutionaries, betraying the revolution itself.

Kang and Liang are here regarded as “radicals”/ “revolutionaries” – without attempt to disentangle the question whether they can really be regarded as “revolutionaries” insofar as they wanted only “reform” (adding something to the existing system instead of, as in revolution, removing the whole system so as to erect a new system upon a clean state).

(4) I plan to use only secondary sources to establish the concept of “mainstreaming”. (I do not plan to consult primary sources for the Hundred Days Reform and Qing’s 1905 proposal for constitutional reform.) The establishment of the “model” will require a few comments upon the situation in Europe from 1789 to 1871, for which secondary sources should suffice. Ambiguities affecting the “model” will be mentioned and explained away (e.g. the fact that the “liberals” in Germany, Austro-Hungarian empire, and Italy also mixed national aspirations with republicanism during the 1848 revolution: the desire for national unity did not change the fact that the original idea of republicanism was about liberty and differed from the national aspiration of Chinese nationalist revolutionaries who wanted national strength, not national unity.) I plan to use primary as well as secondary sources when it comes to describing the conflict between Liang and Sun and between Liu/ He and the Tongmenghui. I also plan to use primary sources as well as secondary sources to explain how He’s pre-mainstreaming approach to revolution can help us better understand why her version of feminism was so radical – so “advanced” as to approximate American Radical Feminism of the 1960s and 1970 – in contradistinction to the sort of nationalist feminism articulated by post-mainstreaming revolutionaries. (Feminism is the climatic point in which the contrast between the pre-mainstreaming and post-mainstreaming revolutionaries can best be illustrated. The nationalists wanted to unbind women’s feet as a means to increase national strength. But if national strength required binding women’s hands as well as their feet, the nationalists would certainly do it. And yet a pre-mainstreaming feminist like He Zhen would never agree to this. One is a fake, and the other a real, feminist.) Because “mainstreaming” is a very typical phenomenon in the history of revolutions (how “revolution is betrayed”) – and the most frequent cause of schism within any revolutionary movement – I will also cite, in passing, a few examples of revolutionary mainstreaming and schism due to mainstreaming from contemporary times. This will help emphasize the typical, or *human*, nature of the Chinese revolutionary movement during the late Qing period.

16 March

Have been watching: “Les rois de France, 15 siècles d’histoire”: “Napoléon III”, “Louis Philippe” (1830 – 1848).

17 March

A perusal of Zourong’s (鄒容) *The Revolutionary Army* (國民軍) and a consideration of the young nationalists’ (student-intellectuals’) sentiment in Schiffrin’s *Sun Yat-sen*, “The Language of Nationalism and Revolution”. *The formation of the basic sentiments of the nationalist revolutionaries after 1900 on which Sun came to rely (his turning point)*. The problems are two: (1) The Chinese are weak and slavish (can’t, and aren’t motivated to, stand up for themselves). (2) The Manchus are weak and prefer to hand over China to foreigners to avoid troubles (to hand over their household slaves to foreign friends; Schiffrin, p. 293). The entire revolutionary fervor comes to focus on the Manchus. The Manchus are hated because they are weak (not because they are tyrants, even though they are lambasted as tyrants). It is the hatred for their weakness which brings into being the language about their tyranny and atrocities. (Schiffrin’s argument is that the increasingly exclusive focus on the Manchus is a matter of expediency: it’s easier to remove the Manchus than to confront the Europeans and Japanese: the latter are much stronger. *In fact, the weaker Manchus, by virtue of their weakness, naturally inspire more hatred than do the Western imperialists, whom, because they are strong, the student-intellectuals admire as well as hate.*) Anti-Manchu revolution will solve problem (2), but a republic (“liberty”) will solve problem (1). It is phenomenological: the student-intellectuals are observing the same thing which Machiavelli has once observed: the love of liberty is equivalent to sanding up for oneself, i.e. strength.⁶

6 Again, it is in Chapter 2, Book II, of his *Discourse on Livy* that Machiavelli describes the equation between the love of freedom and being strong: “Nothing made it more laborious for the Romans to overcome the peoples nearby and parts of the distant provinces than the love that many peoples in those times had for freedom; they defended it so obstinately that they would never have been subjugated if not by an excessive virtue....” The decline in strength and the increase of weakness which characterizes the progress of history from the ancient to modern times are thus correlated with the disappearance of republics: “Thinking then whence it can arise that in those ancient times peoples were more lovers of freedom than in these, I believe it arises from the same cause that makes men less strong now, which I believe is the difference between our education and the ancient, founded on the difference between our religion and the ancient. For our religion, having shown the truth and the true way, makes us esteem less the honor of the world, whereas the Gentiles, esteeming it very much and having placed the highest good in it, were more ferocious in their actions. This can be inferred from many of their institutions, beginning from the magnificence of their sacrifices as against the humility of ours, where there is some pomp more delicate than magnificent but no ferocious or vigorous action. Neither pomp nor magnificence of ceremony was lacking there, but the action of the sacrifice, full of blood and ferocity, was added, with a multitude of animals being killed there. This sight, being terrible, rendered men similar to itself. Besides this, the ancient religion did not beatify men if they were not full of worldly glory, as were captains of armies and princes of republics. Our religion has glorified humble and contemplative more than active men. It has then placed the highest good in humility, abjectness, and contempt of things human; the other placed it in greatness of spirit, strength of body, and all other things capable of making men very strong. And if our religion asks that you have strength in yourself, it wishes you to be capable more of suffering than of doing something strong. This mode of life thus seems to have rendered the world weak and given it in prey to criminal men, who can manage it securely, seeing that the collectivity of men, so as to go to paradise, think more of enduring their beatings than of avenging them. And although the world appears to be made effeminate and heaven disarmed, it arises without doubt more from the cowardice of the men who have interpreted our religion according to idleness and not according to virtue. For if they considered how it permits us the exaltation and defense of the fatherland, they would see that it wishes us to love and honor it and to prepare ourselves to be such that we can defend it. These educations and false interpretations thus bring it about that not as many republics are seen in the world as were seen in antiquity; nor, as a consequence, is as much love of freedom seen in peoples as was then. Still, I believe the cause of this to be rather that the Roman Empire, with its arms and its greatness, eliminated all republics and all civil ways of life. And although that empire was dissolved, the cities still have not been able to put themselves back together or reorder themselves for civil life except in very few places of that

18 March

More notes on Shiffrin's *Sun Yatsen*. Sun relied on the *huaqiao* community. More and more of the *huaqiao* community was won over by Kang's Baohuanghui (保皇會). After 1900s, the student-intellectuals. The *Subao* affair. Anti-Manchu sentiments. After 1903, the student-intellectuals began befriending Sun, including Chen Fan (陳範), the former *Subao* publisher. By 1903, Sun added "the equalization of land rights" to Xinzhonghui's oath (the overthrow of Manchus and the establishment of a republic). The Three Principles of the People were also ready: nationalist, republican, and social revolution all at once. November 1903, Sun published "Preservation or Dismemberment of China". He had now definitely adopted the anti-imperialist sentiments of the student-intellectuals. (Nevertheless, he reserved kind comments for a friendly segment of foreigners.) "The Manchus prefer to give Chinese territory to others than to return it to the Chinese" (p. 312). In Hawaii, December 1903, Sun's confrontation with Kang's crowd. January 1904, his 駁保皇報書. "The Manchus are too weak for one to rely on them for China's protection." He also denied that Chinese people were inexperienced in self-government and rejected the necessity of gradualism espoused by reformers like Kang. Then, Sun's "Warning Letter", in which he tried to expose Liang as a fraud (p. 321).

20 March

More on the *logic* of radicalization in Europe: again, "radicalism" means the liberation of the poor and powerless many from the oppression of the rich and powerful few. (This covers all radicalism in the nineteenth century, although, today, this would be an inadequate definition, since it doesn't cover radicalism on the right. Today, "radicalism" means, more or less, "desiring radical change". Back in that time, radicalism only existed on the left.) Now, in terms of the *logic* of radicalization, socialism is simply an extension of republicanism, just as republicanism is simply an extension of constitutional monarchy: when the parliament and the constitution were first introduced into the *ancien regime*, such was the constitutional monarchy. At this stage, the new commercial and professional class (the bourgeoisie) sought "liberation" from the tyranny of the absolute monarch. When the monarch was removed and replaced with an elected executive, this became a republic: republicanism. But so far, the changes effected to ensure liberation were all political. The next logical step would be the liberation of the workers and peasants who were even below the bourgeoisie, namely, *everyone*. By now, the political change would have to be more radical, and there needed to be economic changes as well. If *everyone* should be liberated to the *maximal* extent, then the very power structure of a republic should be abolished, people should be ruling themselves directly, and all properties should be held in common so that it became impossible for some people to be richer than others. This was socialism/ anarchism/ communism.

empire." The Christian religion which makes people weak is equivalent, in Chinese revolutionaries' eyes, to the emperor system which makes people slavish (and so weak). Giving people liberty – the right to participate in politics – will therefore make them strong. Now, as Machiavelli emphasizes, because liberty means that the citizens are strong, it is only the republic which is strong enough to conquer neighboring lands: "It is an easy thing to know whence arises among peoples this affection for the free way of life, for it is seen through experience that cities have never expanded either in dominion or in riches if they have not been in freedom...." Machiavelli then provides the examples of Athens and Rome. "The reason is easy to understand, for it is not the particular good but the common good that makes cities great. And without doubt this common good is not observed if not in republics, since all that is for that purpose is executed, and although it may turn out to harm this or that private individual, those for whom the aforesaid does good are so many that they can go ahead with it against the disposition of the few crushed by it."

Socialism (etc.) is thus an extension of the previous republicanism and constitutionalism. *They all shared the fundamental goal: liberation of the many from the few.* The difference consists solely in defining who are the many and liberation to what extent. Liberation to a lesser extent is the content of the concept “liberty” (for the republicans) and, to a greater extent, “justice” (for the socialists).

The difference between the Chinese anarchists (Liu/ He) and the republicans (Sun) was thus much deeper (pre-mainstreaming vs post-mainstreaming) than that between the socialists and the republicans in Europe (the goal remaining the same, only differing in degree).

22 March

A contemporary example of “mainstreaming of revolution” and schism within the revolutionary movement due to mainstreaming. (1) The feminists would complain that corporations didn’t hire enough women for managerial positions. (2) The corporations would heed the feminists’ complaint and hire more women for managerial positions. (3) The corporations would then discover that, by placing more women in managerial positions, they can actually increase their profits. They thus consciously implement a plan to hire more women. *This is mainstreaming of the feminist idea:* the feminist idea (equality for women) is now incorporated into the actual economic cosmos to perform a different function (to increase corporations’ profit margins). (4) More insightful feminists like Nancy Fraser then complain that feminism has been distorted into serving the interests of capitalism rather than performing its original function of instituting gender equality or a more just system to replace the unjust capitalist system. (5) Other feminists then rebuke the complaining feminists like Nancy Fraser. *Now there is schism.*

The following are the materials I have read (partly or wholly) since February to prepare for a topic for my master thesis.

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Wang, Fangseng (王汎森), *中國近代思想與學術的系譜*, 聯經出版事業公司, 2003.

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Yoshihiro, Ishikawa, *The Formation of the Chinese Communist Party*, trans. Joshua A. Fogel, New York: Columbia University Press, 2013. (Together with its Japanese original.)

Zarrow, Peter, *Anarchism and Chinese Political Culture*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1990.

Zhang, Yen (張研), 1908 帝國往事, 飛翔時代, 2017.

23 March

At a bookstore in Berkeley, browsed Nancy Fraser, Cinzia Arruzza, and Tithi Bhattacharya, *Feminism for the 99%: A Manifesto*, Verso, 2019.

24 March

Watched a British documentary on the life of Thomas Paine.

Xiaobing Tang, *Global Space and the Nationalist Discourse of Modernity*: „In his *Discourse on the New Citizen*, for example, after explicating nationalism as the legitimizing ideology of a modern nation-state, Liang in the following section urged the Chinese to cultivate an adventurous and enterprising spirit. The European nations are more powerful than China, he wrote, because they are more disposed to adventure and aggression. To illustrate his point, he cited people like Columbus, Martin Luther, Cromwell, and Mazzini as exemplary figures of heroic bravery and determination“ (p. 81).

Started reading Alicia Laspra Rodriguez, „De la Revolución al Imperio: Imágenes discordantes de Napoleón en Gran Bretaña, 1795-1804“ (*Pasado y Memoria. Revista de Historia Contemporánea*, 10, 2011, pp. 41-72).

Watched, „Die Habsburger, IX, Metternich, ein System“ and X „Zwischen Reich und Nation: die junge Kaiser Franz Joseph“.

25 March

Browsed Thomas Paine's *Rights of Man* and *The Age of Reason*.

26 March

At CIA's website's blog. Watched: The Schieffer Panel on „China's Rise“ at CSIS (25.03.2019). With Michael Collins, Deputy Assistant Director of CIA for the East Asia and Pacific Mission Center. Then CIA Director Gina Haspel's speech at the University of Louisville on 24.09.2018.

31 March

Watched „Lizenz zum Töten: wie Israel seine Feinde liquidiert“ (Egmont R. Koch).

4 April

Finished reading the most informative article, Rolando V. Jiménez Domínguez's "Crisis global: neomalthusianos versus poblacionistas", *Mundo Siglo XXI*, No. 20, Primavera 2010, p. 69 – 80.

The Bilderbergers are Neo-Malthusians. They have inherited their hysteria about over-population from Paul Ehrlich and Dennis Meadow. Although the fear about over-population is quite legitimate, the perception of the problem is distorted to fit into the Bilderbergers' interests (to increase their enterprises' profits).

7 April

Reading Jorge MOLERO-MESA, Isabel JIMÉNEZLUCENA, and Carlos TABERNEROHOLGADO, "Neomalthusianismo y eugenesia en un contexto de lucha por el significado en la prensa anarquista española, 1900-1936", in *História, Ciências, Saúde – Manguinhos*, Rio de Janeiro, v.25, supl., ago. 2018, p.105 – 124; and Francis Ronsin, "La classe ouvrière et le néo-malthusianisme: l'exemple français avant 1914", in *Le Mouvement social*, No. 106 (Jan. – Mar., 1979), p. 85 – 117.

In late 19th and early 20th century, the revolutionaries (the anarchists) promoted Neo-Malthusianism (fewer children!) for the sake of promoting a good life among the poor. Today, the Bilderbergers want to promote Neo-Malthusianism in the Muslim world and Africa and other poor places with high birthrate also in order to enable these poor people to live a good life; but this, because, once they have adopted the Western consumerist life-style (the "good life"), they will contribute to the profits of Bilderbergers' enterprises while avoiding economic collapse. The "good life" is a means to an end here, while it was an end in itself among the anarchists a hundred years ago.

15 April

Have been watching Christine Haye's lectures on the Old Testament (Yale, Introduction to the Old Testament, RLST-145) and Dale Martin's lectures on the New Testament (Yale, Introduction to the New Testament and Literature, RLST-152).

21 April

Have been reading: The Mueller Report (Vol. 1 & 2). Then, for my Exam: Maria Eugenia Vásquez Perdomo, *Escrito para no morir: Bitácora de una militancia*, and its English translation by Lorena Terando, *My Life as a Colombian Revolutionary*; and Eduardo Galeano, *Las venas abiertas de América latina* and its English translation by Cedric Belfrage, *Open Veins of Latin America*.

24 April

The other books I have started reading for my Exam with Prof. Alexander: (1) Aviva Chomsky, *A History of the Cuban Revolution*, 2nd Ed. (2) Manlio Argueta, *One Day of Life* (Spanish original: *Un dia en la vida*). (3) Greg Grandin, *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of New Imperialism*. (4) Jerry Davila, *Dictatorship in South America*. (5) Margaret Randall, *Sandino's Daughters*. (6) William Beezley and Colin Maclachlan, *Mexicans In Revolution: 1910 – 1946*. (7) Peter Winn, *Weavers of Revolution*.

Also began watching BBC “The Plot against Harold Wilson” (2006) (with journalists Barrie Penrose and Roger Courtiour).

26 April

Became very interested in the story of Aureliano Babilonia (reading Melquiades' manuscript) in *Cien años de soledad*. Checked out M. Eulalia Montaner, *Guia para la lectura de 'Cien años de soledad'* (Editorial Castalia, 1987) and Gregory Rabassa's translation, *One Hundred Years of Solitude*.