Partial Reading List and Notes

Lawrence C. Chin July – September, 2019

22 July

Downloaded, and listened to on Youtube, Church Committee's "CIA Intelligence Collection About Americans: CHAOS and the Office of Security" (Book III). Then, downloaded from CIA's Library: "Intelligence Reform in the Mid-1970s" (posted 08.05.2007).

Ortega y Gasset has called the human species, instead of Homo sapiens, Homo inscients or Homo insipiens, to emphasize their ignorance rather than knowledge. Harari has been saying that, as machines and computers take over most of the production in the future, most of the human beings will become totally useless. Today, society's division of labor and cooperation scheme - Harari's most important concept – have already created a sharp division between a minority of *Homo sapiens* and a majority of Homo insciens in our society. Back in the tribal time, all human beings in a given tribe were in possession more or less of the total knowledge which the human collective had achieved: every man knew to some extent how to make bows and arrows and how to hunt, and every woman knew to some extent what to gather and how to cook. Today, most of the human beings in a given society possess virtually no parts of the total knowledge which the human collective has achieved: most of them have no idea how factory farming has produced the food they eat, how engineers have designed, and how factories overseas have produced, the computers they use and the cars they drive. In fact, most of the human beings know nothing at all. Not only are they unable to survive in the wild (growing and killing their own food), but they are also unable to make any of the things they use when they live in civilization – they don't even know how these things could have worked. Even the engineers that supposedly know how they work know only partly: no hardware engineer knows how to design the whole computer, but everyone is only specialized in a part of it. In other words, civilization – with its specialization and cooperation scheme – has produced a whole class of worthless people who know nothing (Homo insciens) and has made the rest of the "intellectual elite" increasingly only partial knowers.

28 July

Have been watching two ARTE documentaries: "La nouvelle guerre du Golfe" from Miyuki Droz Aramaki and Sylvain Lepetit plus its German version, and "A qui profite la printemps arabe?" and its German version.

Have also been reading the two chapters on Arab Spring and Libya bombing in Catherine Nay's *L'impétueux: tourments, tourmentes, crises et tempêtes*.

John Stuart Mill begins his Subjection of Women in this way:

The object of this Essay is to explain as clearly as I am able, the grounds of an opinion which I have held from the very earliest period when I had formed any opinions at all on social or political matters, and which, instead of being weakened or modified, has been constantly growing stronger by the progress of reflection and the

experience of life: That the principle which regulates the existing social relations between the two sexes – the legal subordination of one sex to the other – is wrong in itself, and *now one of the chief hindrances to human improvement*; and that it ought to be replaced by a principle of perfect equality, admitting no power or privilege on the one side, nor disability on the other. (Emphasis added.)

Again, the coincidence between social justice and power/ profit/ economic prosperity/ progress. What does "progress" or "human improvement" mean here? Presumably human power over nature!

A new reflection on the causes of dummification. Mill's next paragraph is equally relevant – this time in regard to my dummification thesis.

The very words necessary to express the task I have undertaken, show how arduous it is. But it would be a mistake to suppose that the difficulty of the case must lie in the insufficiency or obscurity of the grounds of reason on which my conviction rests. The difficulty is that which exists in all cases in which there is a mass of feeling to be contended against. So long as an opinion is strongly rooted in the feelings, it gains rather than loses in stability by having a preponderating weight of argument against it. For if it were accepted as a result of argument, the refutation of the argument might shake the solidity of the conviction; but when it rests solely on feeling, the worse it fares in argumentative contest, the more persuaded its adherents are that their feeling must have some deeper ground, which the arguments do not reach; and while the feeling remains, it is always throwing up fresh intrenchments of argument to repair any breach made in the old. And there are so many causes tending to make the feelings connected with this subject the most intense and most deeply-rooted of all those which gather round and protect old institutions and customs, that we need not wonder to find them as yet less undermined and loosened than any of the rest by the progress of the great modern spiritual and social transition; nor suppose that the barbarisms to which men cling longest must be less barbarisms than those which they earlier shake off.

Now I shall combine the insights from Ortega y Gasset and Mill to refine my earlier analyses of dummification. People are dumb – unable to reason about things – because (1) they use emotions rather than reason to judge things and (2) because they are too caught up with the "outside" (*alteración*) and unable to retreat into themselves to reflect (*ensimismamiento*). There is therefore a connection between emotions and *alteración*.

(1) Ortega y Gasset offers a description of dummification in the first chapter of *El hombre y la gente* ("Ensimismamiento y alteración"). After describing the unique human ability to retreat from the world into oneself to think about things – how this ability isn't a given but is frequently lost throughout history, how a human being thinks not for thinking's own sake but in order to act and survive ("... no vivimos para pensar sino que pensamos para lograr subsistir o pervivir..." *Obras completas*, VI, p. 92), and how a human being is therefore hardly *la chose pensante* as Descartes has thought (the wrongheaded *intelectualismo* which has characterized Western philosophy ever since the Greeks) – he notes that the loss of *ensimismamiento* is precisely the cause of dummification:

A la aberración intelectualista que aisla la contemplación de la acción, ha sucedido la aberración opuesta: la voluntarista, que se exonera de la contemplación y diviniza la acción pura. Esta es una manera de interpretar erróneamente la tesis anterior, de que el hombre es primaria y fundamentalmente acción.... Como otras veces aconteció en el pasado conocido, vuelven ahora - y me refiero a estos años, casi a lo que va del siglo – vuelven ahora los pueblos a sumergirse en la alteración. ¡Lo mismo que pasó en Roma! Comenzó Europa dejándose atropellar por el placer, como Roma por lo que Ferrero ha llamado la «luxuria», el exceso, el lujo de las comodidades. Luego ha sobrevenido el atropellamiento por el dolor y por el espanto. Como en Roma, las luchas sociales y las guerras consiguientes llenaron las almas de estupor. Y el estupor, la forma máxima de alteración, el estupor, cuando persiste, se convierte en estupidez. Ha llamado la atención a algunos que desde hace tiempo, con reiteración de leitmotiv, en mis escritos me refiero al hecho no suficientemente conocido de que el mundo antiguo, ya en tiempo de Cicerón, comenzó a volverse estúpido. Se ha dicho que su maestro Posidonio fue el último hombre de aquella civilización capaz de ponerse delante de las cosas y pensar efectivamente en ellas. Se perdió – como amenaza perderse en Europa, si no se pone remedio – la capacidad de ensimismarse, de recogernos con serenidad en nuestro fondo insobornable. Se habla sólo de acción. Los demagogos, empresarios de la alteración, que ya han hecho morir a varias civilizaciones, hostigan a los hombres para que no reflexionen, procuran mantenerlos hacinados en muchedumbres para que no puedan reconstruir su persona donde únicamente se reconstruye, que es en la soledad. Denigran el servicio a la verdad, y nos proponen en su lugar: mitos. Y con todo ello, logran que los hombres se apasionen, y entre fervores y horrores se pongan fuera de sí. Claro está, como el hombre es el animal que ha logrado meterse dentro de sí, cuando el hombre se pone fuera de sí es que aspira a descender, y recae en la animalidad. Tal es la escena, siempre idéntica, de las épocas en que se diviniza la pura acción. El espacio se puebla de crímenes. Pierde valor, pierde precio la vida de los hombres y se practican todas las formas de la violencia y del despojo. Sobre todo, del despojo. Por eso, siempre que se observe que asciende sobre el horizonte y llega al predominio la figura del puro hombre de acción, lo primero que uno debe hacer es abrocharse.....

Dislocada en esta forma de su normal conyuntura con la contemplación, con el ensimismamiento, la pura acción permite y suscita sólo un encadenamiento de insensateces que mejor deberíamos llamar «desencadenamiento». Así vemos hoy que una actitud absurda justifica el advenimiento de otra actitud antagónica, pero tampoco razonable; por lo menos, suficientemente razonable, y así sucesivamente. Pues las cosas de la política han llegado en Occidente al extremo que, de puro haber perdido todo el mundo la razón, resulta que acaban teniéndola todos. Sólo que, entonces, la razón que cada uno tiene no es la suya, sino la que el otro ha perdido. Estando así las cosas, parece cuerdo que allí donde las circunstancias dejen un respiro, por débil que éste sea, intentemos romper ese círculo mágico de la alteración, que nos precipita de insensatez en insensatez; parece cuerdo que nos digamos – como, después de todo, nos decimos muchas veces en nuestra vida más vulgar siempre que nos atropella el contorno, que nos sentimos perdidos en un torbellino de problemas – que nos digamos: ¡Calma! ¿Qué sentido lleva este imperativo? Sencillamente, el de invitarnos a suspender un momento la acción que amenaza con enajenarnos y con hacernos

perder la cabeza; suspender un momento la acción, para recogernos dentro de nosotros mismos, pasar revista a nuestras ideas sobre la circunstancia y forjar un plan estratégico. (Ibid., p. 94 – 96; emphasis added.)

Beautiful! But, as you have seen, my own experiences seems to be just the opposite. My difficulty with people seems to stem from people's absolute inability to get out of themselves to see what I really am. Namely, it seems that people are dummified when they, after retreating into themselves to work out their ideas about the world, can never emerge out of themselves again in order to interact with the world. I have persistently referred, in my "Political Correctness as Culture Industry", to people's sole interaction with the ideas inside their head to the point that they can no longer interact with the objects and people outside themselves. I have, for example, derived my description of the problem from my experience with public defenders and my family members: when I talked to the supervisor of my public defender for the first time, he immediately assumed I was insane and delusional and never let me talk but simply continued to lecture me on how delusional people didn't know they were delusional. The same with my public defender Ms Warren. My family members (my father and mother) also immediately assumed I had been lazy and not doing anything and hanging out with criminal friends and committing crimes and giving away my money: the fictional character they had invented out of their own head without ever checking with me in any way whatever. All the people around me are so stuck with their preconceptions and stereotypes about me that they are simply unable to really see me and notice that their preconceptions and stereotypes don't actually describe me. As a result, they live in a fantasy world dotted with simple stereotypes rather than in a real world populated by complex characters, and for this reason I call them "stupid" - insofar as I have defined "intelligence" as the ability to relate to and represent correctly the external reality. It seems that, in my past writings, dummification is described as being caused by imprisonment in oneself rather than characterized by total immersion with things outside oneself (alteración) and an inability to retreat into oneself. Ortega has derived his description from his impression of the particular problem of his time – how fascist demagogues were able to incite the passions of the unthinking masses and make them unable to retreat into themselves to think - while I have derived my description from my experience of the dumb and vulgar people of my time. Could it be that the nature of dummification has changed in the 90 years that separate us?

Not quite. Contemporary dummification can also be described as *alteración* rather than as imprisonment in oneself. Refer to my description of the dummification of the left in "Rationalization, McDonaldization, and Increasing Stupidity" and think once more about the contemporary denunciation of "white supremacists" and "rape apologists" among the mainstream left. For example, the mainstream left's denunciation of Brittany Pettibone, Lindsay Shepherd, or Nancy Rommelman.¹ Note that these dissenters are really complaining about the same problem as I have been: that the descriptors which people from the mainstream left use to describe them don't really describe them at all (more to demonize them than to describe them). The problem, as noted, is that the descriptors "racist", "sexist", "white supremacist", and "homophobic" and so on result when categories and classification scheme from the past have congealed and persisted by the present time to result in simple stereotypes which are too simple and outdated as to be able to represent adequately the contemporary rightwing spectrum which has updated itself. (And Lindsay Shepherd isn't even rightwing but a leftist conservative.) This means that Ortega's description must be modified to be applicable to the contemporary phenomenon of dummification. On the one hand the problem does seem to be that the people on the left are unable to

¹ For the case of Nancy Rommelmann, see her presentation at Prager University: https://youtu.be/DMZzivv8wPA.

get out of their ideas to realize that these ideas do not apply to the things they believe they do: Brittany Pettibone and Lindsay Shepherd are not actually "white supremacists", and Nancy Rommelmann is not a "rape apologist". The people on the left don't actually listen to what the three women have to say let alone analyze it and debate it with reason, they simply, immediately upon learning that the women are saying things contrary to the accepted conclusions of the left, label them "white supremacist" and "rape apologist" and are forever unable to get of this trap. But here the problem with the people on the left is not that they are so stuck with the ideas inside their head that they couldn't get out to see the world – although it does seem that way – but that they are unable to retreat into themselves to think about – not things, but the ideas that are current in a society. In other words, Ortega is wrong to assume that our world is composed only of things; it is also composed of ideas – ideas which the previous generations have created and bequeathed upon us as descriptions of (in this case) our social reality. We hear the words "racist", "sexist", and "white supremacist" and so on everyday in our environment and acquire the impression that they are accurate descriptors of certain aspects of our social reality – even when our social reality has changed and updated itself since the time when these labels were invented. We then apply these descriptors to those people who seem to bear resemblance to them – the people on the right and so on - and yet flounder just as we do when we apply "horse" to mules or "red" to purple. In other words, we are so caught up with the ideas that, thanks to the effort of the previous generations, have become part of our world just as the things that make up our world, that we are unable to retreat into ourselves to reflect on these ideas – to carefully compare them with the people and things and phenomena which they supposedly describe to see whether they really describe these people and things and phenomena.

While Ortega had in mind the people on the right when he spoke of *alteración*, I have in mind the people on the left. But, really, what I have just described applies to people on both the left and the right and then everyone else in other circumstances as well. Thus the stereotypes of crazy, delusional schizophrenics have become, thanks to the effort of previous generations (psychiatrists and mental health workers), part of our social world as much as cars and chairs and computers. Because I looked ugly and detestable, my public defenders immediately applied the labels to me without ever retreating into themselves to ponder whether these ideas really described the people and objects and things they assumed they described. The problem is again *alteración* and the inability to retreat into oneself (*ensimismarse*). When people are unable to interact with the world outside themselves and only capable of interacting with the ideas inside their head, it is not imprisonment in themselves – although it seems like it – but *alteración* because the ideas in their head are in fact just objects out there in the world. The dumb, vulgar masses are hardly able to come up with any original ideas themselves.

These examples show that, when man retreats into himself to develop ideas about the things outside himself, when he comes out of himself and puts these ideas forward so that these ideas may themselves become part of the external world in which the next generation will submerge themselves – the next generation then becomes so caught up in these ideas (*alteración* with the ideas that are outside themselves) that they are unable to retreat into themselves again to reflect on these ideas – whether these ideas *still* correspond to reality at all. This is what I have attempted to describe in "Political Correctness as Culture Industry" and "Rationalization, McDonaldization, and Increasing Stupidity". In the case of my family members and acquaintances, they have so totally submerged themselves in the stereotypes of "crazy", "delusional", and "dangerous" that they take for granted that these stereotypes do describe me, unable to retreat into themselves to reflect whether they really describe me at all.

However, we have to again wonder whether this problem is a constant throughout history and not something new. People in the past were also unable to retreat into themselves to ponder whether the ideas they used to understand the world really did describe the world at all. People who believed in spirits and demons and gods were only capable of conceiving everything in the world (rain, snow, thunder) in terms of these imaginary entities and completely unable to retreat into themselves to develop new ideas that would better describe these natural phenomena. The natural philosophers who first developed more adequate ideas to describe natural phenomena could be said to have retreated into themselves to reflect on the traditional ideas – and they realized that one couldn't know whether the old ideas were right unless one tested them empirically: here what seems to be *alteración* was in fact *ensimismamiento*. If my family members and acquaintances could retreat into themselves, they would reemerge to do experiment with me in order to see whether I was really crazy and dangerous!

Finally, Ortega is wrong to say that any people might lose the ability to retreat into themselves: for most of the people throughout most of history, *ensimismamiento* is never something they are capable of in any case. *Ensimismamiento* has always been the prerogative of a minority of geniuses. What he says is decisively human is only so for a minority of human beings.

(2) This is what it means when it is said that people use their emotions to judge things rather than their reason: alteracón. These ideas which the previous generations have left behind and which are inscribed in our social reality so that we may understand our world through them – they also have an emotional valence. The idea of "white supremacist" for example contains within itself all the anger and disgust which our ancestors (the social justice warriors from the 1960s and so on) had felt toward the racist southerners. When we submerge ourselves with this idea and use it to understand people who seem to bear resemblance to it - alteración - we are also submerging ourselves with the strong emotion attached to this idea. *Alteración* means not only being caught up with ideas as well as with things, it also means being caught up with the emotions contained within these ideas. Many of these social justice ideas are so strongly emotionally charged that they are just like the "myths" of which Ortega has spoken. The strong emotion makes it even more difficult for one to retreat into oneself to think about the idea – to ponder whether it really describes the thing which it is supposed to describe – because emotion makes conviction (in this case, the conviction that the idea does describe the thing in question) certain. When one does not doubt, one is less likely to ensimismarse. Being certain what one is dealing with, one thus doesn't even listen to what the "white supremacist" actually has to say before becoming convinced that she is a "white supremacist". Thus, for example, Lindsay Shepherd is stunned to hear people on the left calling her a "white supremacist" when she has never entertained the idea that white people are superior to other races – just as so many people assume I'm insane and delusional and dangerous when they have never interacted with me in anyway whatever. It is in this way that emotion makes people dumb. This is my way of rephrasing what Mill was trying to get at: resistance to argumentation when a conclusion is rooted in feelings rather than in an argument.

I'm remind also of how Silvio (another typical leftwing progressive) was offended when I described to him how immigration was bad for the environment. Although a PhD candidate (in classics), he had no ability to reason. Seeing no flaws in my description, he simply got angry and started attacking me personally. Just as Mill has said: his conviction that immigration is good is rooted in feelings (that immigrants are poor people whom we must help) rather than in reasoning or even in knowledge of facts (most of the immigrants are not even poor people). He is pure *alteración* – with his ideas and feelings. To be able to reason, one must *overcome emotions* and retreat into oneself, away from one's

preestablished conclusion *and emotions*, to think about whether the conclusion is really correct and whether the strong emotion should ever have been attached to it in the first place.

31 July

Watched Jade Lindgaard's exposition of Bernard-Henri Lévy (<u>https://youtu.be/tNI1XrzOA7Q</u>). (1) He is not a philosopher: he has nothing original to say. (2) He is not an intellectual on the left but an *intellectual officiel*: his principal purpose is to defend the Establishment (*Pouvoir établi*). E.g. his defense of Nicholas Sarkozy in 2011 during the bombing of Libya and his systematic defense of the actions of Israel in occupied territories. (*Il défend un discours humanitaire*.) (3) He used to sell a lot of books, but now less and less.

1 August

Note that, during an interview with Nailya Asker-Zade (early 2018), Dmitry Peskov commented that the "special services" of Russia and the United States had been in constant contact in the past few years (36:00). He *could* be referring to the battle between the CIA and the SVR in the International Court of Justice throughout 2016 and 2017.



Watched Daniele Ganser's lecture: "Venezuela 2019 – Ein gescheiterter Putsch der USA" (Nürnberg 1.4.2019) along with his lecture: "Der illegale Krieg von Saudi-Arabien gegen Jemen 2015" (Offenbach 2.4.2019).

Also began reading the second book for my HIST 600 class: Aaron Sheehan-Dean's *Why Conferates Fought*. A very boring book!

3 August

Watched Klagemauer TV's report: "Express Zeitung und Jo Conrad: Die Kulturrevolution ist (mal wieder) voll in Gange".

5 August

Watched fragments from the documentary "Espana en libertad". About the history of Spain after Franco, from 1975 to 2004.

Also began reading (for HIST 600) Douglas R. Egerton's *Thunder at the Gates* and Stanley Harrold's *Border War*.

7 August

While the biggest problem with people is that they don't know they are stupid and ignorant – stupid and ignorant people don't ever know they are stupid and ignorant – Ortega y Gasset also concludes that intelligent people always know why they are intelligent:

Es palmario que un ser inteligente que no entiende por qué es inteligente no es inteligente: su inteligencia es sólo presunta. (Obras completas, Tomo VI, p. 116.)

Ortega's existentialist formula for what constitutes a human being (in both *El hombre y la gente* and *Historia como sistema*) – that s/he is not obliged to *be* anything in particular such as animals and objects are but only obliged to always *do* something in order to make of himself or herself something in particular – something that is not decided in advance but is one of the many possibilities offered by the world: this reminds me of Wes' wisdom: "Why do people devote themselves to causes and go to war and kill each other? To give themselves something to do..." Ortega fails to emphasize that, when one is obliged to do something in order to make something out of oneself, one is most of the time just wasting time and might as well sleep all day. The stupid masses are hardly able to come up with something worthwhile to devote themselves to.

8 August

The phenomenological distinctions which Ortega y Gasset makes between *present* and *compresent* and between *actual* and *habitual*, can actually better clarify dummification: *the phenomenology of dummification*. Here is how he explains the distinctions – originally due to Husserl:

Y lo primero que es menester decir paréceme ser esto: si el mundo se compone de cosas, éstas tendrán una a una que serme dadas. Una cosa es, por ejemplo, una manzana. Prefiramos suponer que es la manzana del Paraíso y no la de la discordia. Pero en esa escena del Paraíso descubrimos ya un problema curioso: la manzana que Eva presenta a Adán ¿es la misma que Adán ve, halla y recibe? Porque al ofrecerla Eva es presente, visible, patente sólo media manzana, y la que Adán halla, ve y recibe es también sólo media manzana. Lo que se ve, lo que es, rigorosamente hablando, presente, desde el punto de vista de Eva es algo distinto de lo que se ve y es presente

desde el punto de vista de Adán. En efecto, toda cosa corpórea tiene dos caras y, como de la luna, sólo una de esas caras tenemos presente. Ahora caemos, sorprendidos, en la cuenta de algo que es, una vez advertido, gran perogrullada, a saber: que ver, lo que se llama estrictamente ver, nadie ha visto nunca eso que llama manzana, porque ésta tiene, a lo que se cree, dos caras, pero nunca es presente más que una. Y, además, que si hay dos seres que la ven, ninguno ve de ella la misma cara sino otra más o menos distinta.

Ciertamente yo puedo dar vueltas en torno a la manzana o hacerla girar en mi mano. En este movimiento se me van haciendo presentes aspectos, esto es, caras distintas de la manzana, cada una en continuidad con la precedente. Cuando estoy viendo, lo que se llama ver, la segunda cara me acuerdo de la que vi antes y la sumo a aquélla. Pero, bien entendido, esta suma de lo recordado a lo efectivamente visto no hace que yo pueda ver juntos todos los lados de la manzana. Esta, pues, en cuanto unidad total, por tanto, en lo que entiendo cuando digo «manzana», jamás me es presente; por tanto, no me es con radical evidencia, sino sólo, ya lo sumo, con una evidencia de segundo orden - la que corresponde al mero recuerdo -, donde se conservan nuestras experiencias anteriores acerca de una cosa. De aquí que a la efectiva presencia de lo que sólo es parte de una cosa automáticamente se va agregando al resto de ella, del cual diremos, pues, que no es presentado, pero sí compresentado o comprensente. Ya verán la luz que esta idea de lo comprensente, de la compresencia aneja a toda presencia de algo, idea debida al gran Edmundo Husserl, nos va a proporcionar para aclararnos el modo como aparecen en nuestra vida las cosas y el mundo en que las cosas están.

Lo segundo que conviene hacer notar es esto otro: Nos hallamos ahora en este salón, que es una cosa en cuyo interior estamos. Es un interior por estas dos razones: porque nos rodea o envuelve por todos lados y porque su forma es cerrada, esto es, continua. Sin interrupción, su superficie se hace presente a nosotros de suerte que no vemos nada más que ella; no tiene agujeros o aberturas, discontinuidades, brechas o rendijas que nos dejen ver otras cosas que no son ella y sus objetos interiores, asientos, paredes, luces, etc. Pero imaginemos que al salir de aquí, cuando la lección concluya, nos encontrásemos con que no había nada más allá, esto es, fuera, que no había el resto del mundo en torno a ella, que sus puertas dieran no a la calle, a la ciudad, al Universo, sino a la Nada. Hallazgo tal nos produciría un choc de sorpresa y de terror. ¿Cómo se explica ese choc si ahora, mientras estamos aquí, sólo teníamos presente este salón y no habíamos pensado, de no haber yo hecho esta observación, en si había o no un mundo fuera de sus puertas - es decir, en si existía, en absoluto, un fuera? La explicación no puede ofrecer duda. También Adán habría sufrido un choc de sorpresa, aunque más leve, si hubiese resultado que lo que Eva le daba era sólo media manzana, la mitad que él podía ver, pero faltando la otra media compreseñte. En efecto, mientras este salón nos es sensu stricto presente nos es comprensente el resto del mundo fuera de él y, como en el caso de la manzana, esta compresencia de lo que no es patente pero que una experiencia acumulada nos hace saber que aun no estando a la vista existe, está ahí y se puede y se tiene que contar con su posible presencia, es un saber que se nos ha convertido en habitual, que llevamos en nosotros habitualizado. Ahora bien, lo que en nosotros actúa por hábito adquirido, a fuer de serlo, no lo

advertimos especialmente, no tenemos de ello una conciencia particular, actual. Junto a la pareja de nociones presente y compresente nos conviene también distinguir esta otra: lo que nos es *actualmente*., en un acto preciso, expreso, y lo que nos es *habitualmente*, que está constantemente siéndonos, existiendo para nosotros, pero en esa forma velada, inaparente y como dormida de la habitualidad. Apúntese, pues, en la memoria esta otra pareja: actualidad y habitualidad. Lo presente es para nosotros en actualidad; lo compresente, en habitualidad. (Obras completas, VI, p. 117 – 119)

Refer back to my explication in "Rationalization, McDonaldization, and Increasing Stupidity of Human Beings". The *compresent* is supplied by the preexisting grand narrative or mental schema or categories or representations – this is what Ortega has referred to as the "habitual" or the "accumulated experience": "... una experiencia acumulada nos hace saber que aun no estando a la vista existe, está ahí y se puede y se tiene que contar con su posible presencia..." (emphasis added). It is the preexisting grand narrative or mental schema which enable us to imagine, and expect, the other half of the apple when we see only one side of it and which cause us to be surprised if, when we turn the apple around, we don't see the other side. This mental operation is negatively designated as "cognitive miser" because, the world being more complex than our mental schema about it, there are in fact occasions when only half an apple is presented to us and we, being so lazy, simply assume that the other half is there (*compresent*) without ever bothering to turn the apple around to discover that it is really *not* there. When I spoke of the inflexibility of the contemporary mind, I'm referring to the fact that the mind is so imprisoned in the habitual that it literally couldn't even imagine the *possibility* that the apple might be only a half one. The psychiatrist will never believe that there is really a chip inside my brain and that I don't hear voices and suffer schizophrenia also because s/he is completely imprisoned in the habitual and becomes totally inflexible in thinking. Note that the habitual (the grand narrative, the mental schema) is deficient because it is geared only toward the most frequent cases and doesn't in fact cover all possibilities – there are times when the apple is really only half and intelligence agencies really plant chips inside people's brain. (Recall my analysis in "Political Correctness as Culture Industry" that psychiatrists make diagnoses by assuming that what is probable or frequent is certain and always the case.) One way to increase one's mind's flexibility is therefore to read about the extraordinary and exceptional circumstances – for example, read about the CIA's and the Pentagon's secret mind-control programs - in order to get an idea about what is possible. It will then not be so surprising when one finds only half an apple or people who really have chips planted inside their brain. Dummification is thus not only caused by "cognitive miser" and the inflexibility of the mind, but the latter are also reinforced by the deficiency in knowledge about the world.

The previous social justice categories and vocabularies and mental health diagnoses have persisted and congealed into simple stereotypes at the present age so that, when the world has changed or complexified, they would fail to describe it and the people using them to understand reality would misunderstand and become dummified – that's like how the old habit tells you the other side of the apple is always there while the world has changed so that apples are increasingly just half apples. And yet you are too lazy to turn it around when you see an apple and so never discover that what is compresent is in fact not there anymore (that the world has changed). You are then dummified – have lost touch with reality.

Ortega next delineates the structure of our world by noting its three layers: the side of things which are directly present to us plus their backs which we can't see but which are compresent; the other things *around* which we do see but to which we pay no attention and which form thus the background or

horizon for the first things on which we concentrate our attention; and the rest of the world which we can't see at all but which we have read about or seen before and which we therefore assume exist (the vast and immense compresent). These social justice vocabularies and categories are what have formed our beliefs about the rest of the world which we can't see at all but which we assume exist. Nobody has seen the fact that women are paid less for the same work or that our society is characterized by bigotry, but we are taught that that's what the rest of the world is like which we can't see at all. Our ancestors have gone to that unseen part of the world and come back with descriptions and we assume these descriptions are correct or continue to be correct and not outdated. We cannot question whether the unseen part of the world is really like that as long as we are in the mode of *alteración* with these descriptions and deciding to come out so as to venture into that unseen part of the world to check whether they are really correct.

12 August

Listened to Rainer Rothfuß' lecture "Alternative zum globalen Pakt für Massenmigration" published on the channel See Gespräche on 08.10.2018.

13 August

Listened to STWT Show 101 (Titus Frost 1984) which SDW has liked: just as RT, he affirms that Epstein was Mossad and lists Clinton's body-counts.

16 August

Watched Biography 02.12.1997, "Sam Walton: An American Dream" and "El manual del dictador: Benito Mussolini". Plus many videos on Google Home and Amazon's Alexa and Echo.

18 August

Listened to four recent interviews with Whitney Webb about the Jeffrey Epstein's case.

20 August

Dr P is always looking for my diaries or other poor quality writings on my website as evidences to convince the authority that I'm indeed fluffy and unintellectual as well as terrorizing her and then bragging about it on my website. She takes extreme caution to avoid my regular writings, which are of too good quality for her. It's like: if she wants to make a case in court that elephant is a robe, she will search online for all the pictures of elephants she could find but take care to select only pictures of elephants' tails while hiding away the rest. She will then present to court all the pictures of elephants' tails to convince the judge that the so-called elephant is indeed a rope-like entity.


I sometimes wonder whether, when the feminists continue to reiterate how women are paid less for the same work and so on, they are not also simply arguing, as it were, that the elephant is a string-like entity by continuing to throw at us pictures of the elephant's tail while ignoring all the pictures of the other parts of the elephant's body.

21 August

Began reading Stanley Harrold's Border War for my History 600 class.

25 August

Watched several Berlusconi documentaries: ARTE "Die Akte Berlusconi" (01.02.2011); ZDF "Berlusconi und die Mafia" (23.09.2016); ARD "Sex, Skandale, Schuldenkrise: die Berlusconi Show in Italien" (27.02.2013); and Toute l'Histoire: "Berlusconi, pouvoir et décadence".



Read Whitney Webb's 23.08.2019 piece: "From 'Spook Air' to the 'Lolita Express': the genesis and evolution of the Jeffrey Epstein-Bill Clinton relationship" (Mint Press).

29 August

When we follow Ortega y Gasset a little further in *El hombre y la gente*, we realize that intelligence, in addition to being the state in which one has a proper representation of the external reality in one's head, is also *existing authentically* in the existentialist sense. In his phenomenological description of our "world", after explaining compresence, Ortega explains our *radical solitude* in which we can never have direct experience of what other people are feeling – we can only feel our own pains, not those of others, which, as I have repeatedly emphasized, is God's greatest gift to us because it enables us to inflict pains on others without cost – so that the thoughts and feelings of other people, their interior state, while real because we can infer them from their facial expressions and bodily movements, are reality of second or third degree and so on, or lesser reality in comparison with our own feelings and

thoughts of which we are totally sure. The interior state of other people is thus also *compresent* in this sense. But Ortega then emphasizes that we live, because of our socialization, as if these realities of second and third degree were as real as the reality of the first degree – as if other people's feelings and thoughts were present to us to the same degree as our own. What is compresent is always mistaken for what is present. In my connection, I would of course say that this is not only true for the interior state of other people, but also for social realities that are merely compresent – like the fact that women are paid less for the same work: we always take this to be certain knowledge on the same par as my perception of this chair right in front of me. Such state is, as noted, *alteración* and it is only when we retreat into ourselves that we come to notice that the fact about women's being paid less as well as the interior state of other people is in fact reality of second or third degree, hardly as certain as my knowledge about the chair I'm sitting on or about my own thoughts and feelings.

Pero si lo que digo es cierto... nuestra vida normal consiste en ocuparnos con prágmata, con cosas o asuntos e importancias que no lo son propiamente, sino meras interpretaciones irresponsables de los demás o nuestras propias, quiere decir que siendo nuestra vida un estar siempre haciendo algo con esas pseudo-cosas, irremediablemente sería un pseudo-hacer, precisamente aquel que anteriormente nos aparecía con la vulgarísima pero profundísima expresión de «hacer que se hace»; es decir, solemos hacer que vivimos, pero no vivimos efectivamente nuestro auténtico vivir, el que tendríamos que vivir si, deshaciéndonos de todas esas interpretaciones recibidas de los demás entre quienes estamos y que suele llamarse «sociedad», tomásemos, de cuando en cuando, enérgico, evidente contacto con nuestra vida en cuanto realidad radical. Pero ésta es, dijimos, lo que somos en radical soledad. Se trata, pues, de la necesidad que el hombre tiene periódicamente de poner bien en claro las cuentas del negocio que es su vida y de que sólo él es responsable, recurriendo de la óptica en que vemos y vivimos las cosas en cuanto somos miembros de la sociedad, a la óptica en que ellas aparecen cuando nos retiramos a nuestra soledad. En la soledad el hombre es su verdad - en la sociedad tiende a ser su mera convencionalidad o falsificación. En la realidad auténtica del humano vivir va incluido el deber de la frecuente retirada al fondo solitario de sí mismo. Esa retirada en que a las meras verosimilitudes, cuando no simples embelesos e ilusiones, en que vivimos, les exigimos que nos presenten sus credenciales de auténtica realidad, es lo que se llama con un nombre amanerado, ridículo y confusionario, filosofía. La filosofía es retirada, anábasís, arreglo de cuentas de uno consigo mismo, en la pavorosa desnudez de sí mismo ante sí mismo. Delante de otro no estamos, no podemos estar integralmente desnudos: si el otro nos mira, con su mirada, ya, más o menos, nos cubre ante nuestros propios ojos. Esto es el extraño fenómeno del rubor en que la carne desnuda parece cubrirse con un paño sonrosado, a fin de ocultarse....

La filosofía no es, pues, una ciencia, sino, si se quiere, una indecencia, pues es poner a las cosas y a sí mismo desnudos, en las puras carnes – en lo que puramente son y soy – nada más. Por eso es, si ella es posible, auténtico conocimiento – lo cual no son nunca *sensu stricto* las ciencias, sino que son meras técnicas útiles para el manejo sutil, el refinado aprovechamiento de las cosas. Pero la filosofía es la verdad, la terrible y desolada, solitaria verdad de las cosas. (*Obras completas*, p. 144 – 145.) Ortega thus concludes that philosophy is the critique of conventionality: "Es, pues, filosofía la crítica de la vida convencional, incluso y muy especialmente de su vida – crítica que el hombre se ve obligado a hacer de cuando en cuando, llevando a aquélla ante el tribunal de su vida auténtica, de su inexorable soledad" (ibid., p. 146). In this context, philosophy, or authentic living, is phenomenology, wherein we, left alone to reflect, discover that what has hitherto been taken to be certain (the compresent aspects of reality: the feelings of other people and the rest of the world which we don't see but assume to exist) is not so certain. I have merely applied this insight to conventional knowledge about social reality which has become such, i.e. conventional, thanks to the agitation of feminist revolutionaries and so on. This means that, when people of the mainstream left accept, without reflection and investigation, that women are paid less for the same work – when they are in the state of *alteración* in regard to prevalent and established opinions – and act on this supposed truism, they are merely pretending to live (hacer que se hace), namely, living inauthentically. All the people of the mainstream left are merely "conventional", merely members of their society rather than truly themselves. A few souls, such as Christina Hoff Sommers, are able to retreat into themselves (ensimismarse) and wonder whether established truism is really true (whether what is compresent is really present) – and then come out to investigate the matter. Such persons are "intelligent" in my sense of the word since they seek a truer representation of the external reality, but they are also, according to Ortega here, living authentically (auténtico vivir). Such persons are philosophers.

I of course don't necessarily share Ortega's devaluation of sciences here. When one pursues sciences in order to understand reality rather than to simply control things – when, as Ortega notes in *Historia como sistema*, one lets science reveal the transcendental aspect of reality – one achieves a truer representation of reality and is, in this sense, both more intelligent and living authentically. When science becomes philosophy – that was the purpose of my Scientific Enlightenment.

30 August

In the past few days, watched: Henry Mayer's lecture on his book *All On Fire: William Lloyd Garrison and the Abolition of Slavery* at the Mechanics Institute of San Francisco (1999); Louise W. Knight's lecture, "Sarah Grimke and the Feminist Tradition", at Shimer College of Chicago; Merrill Peterson's lecture on his book *John Brown: The Legend Revisited* (2002); and Stanley Harrold's lecture "Abolitionism and the Coming of the Civil War" at Vanderbilt University, on 21.01.2011.

1 September

Y como una de las cosas que más intensa y frecuentemente hacen esos hombres en nuestro inmediato contorno, en su actividad reciprocante, es hablar unos con otros y conmigo, con su hablar inyectan en mí sus ideas sobre las cosas todas y yo veo desde luego el mundo todo al través de esas ideas recibidas. Esto significa que la aparición del Otro es un hecho que queda siempre como a la espalda de nuestra vida, porque al sorprendernos por vez primera viviendo, nos hallamos ya, no sólo con los otros y en medio de los otros, sino habituados a ellos (ibid., p. 149 - 50).

Alteración – going along with others – is thus the primordial state, whereas *ensimismamiento* – retreating into ourselves to reflect whether what other people are saying is correct – is the derivative state. And thus intelligence and living authentically only come after stupidity and living inauthentically. That, primordially, we see the world as others see it and only afterward are able to retreat from this is

what Yuval Noah Harari has referred to when he explains how human beings could have come to believe in the fictions which enable them to work together: when you keep repeating the same bullshit to a child, s/he will grow up convinced that it is true.

4 September

Prof. Ford assigned the reading for me: John Stauffer, *The Black Hearts of Men*; and Manisha Sinha, *The Slave's Cause: A History of Abolition*.

5 September

Watched ARTE Reportage: "Russie : Arctique, la nouvelle frontière" (07.03.2019). Russia extracts one quarter of its petroleum from the Arctic, and 80% of its natural gas. One third of the planet's hydrocarbon energy sources reside in the Arctic and global warming has made extraction in the Arctic much easier. (The Arctic is warming at twice the rate as the rest of the planet.) Russia has been intensively exploiting the Arctic in the past two years. (Novatek is doing it with Total and Chinese National Petroleum Corporation.)

6 September

Read Charlie Savage's "Judge rules terrorism watchlist violates constitutional rights", in *The New York Time*, 04.09.2019. And downloaded the corresponding court document, Anas Elhady et al v. Charles H. Kable et al (Director of the Terrorist Screening Center). Note: "Judge Anthony J. Trenga of United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia said the standard for inclusion in the database was too vague... As of 2017, about 1.2 million people were on the watchlist, which is maintained by the F.B.I.'s Terrorist Screening Center. Although a vast majority of them were foreigners abroad, about 4,600 were American citizens who are protected by the Constitution."

9 September

Began reading Ortega y Gasset, "La deshumanización del arte". The newer art, because the dumb masses couldn't understand it, reveals to them the truth about themselves, that they should hardly be considered sovereign at all, and for this reason they hate modern art – unlike the usual manner in which a new art displeases: when one understands it and yet doesn't like it per the accident of taste. The newer art, in this regard, also makes the minority who understand it recognize the truth about themselves:

Por otra parte, el arte joven contribuye también a que los «mejores» se conozcan y reconozcan entre el gris de la muchedumbre y aprendan su misión, que consiste en ser pocos y tener que combatir contra los muchos.

Thus:

Se acerca el tiempo en que la sociedad, desde la política al arte, volverá a organizarse, según es debido, en dos órdenes o rangos: el de los hombres egregios y el de los hombres vulgares. Todo el malestar de Europa vendrá a desembocar y curarse en esa nueva y salvadora escisión. La unidad indiferenciada, caótica, informe, sin

arquitectura anatómica, sin disciplina regente en que se ha vivido por espacio de ciento cincuenta años, no puede continuar. Bajo toda la vida contemporánea late una injusticia profunda e irritante: el falso supuesto de la igualdad real entre los hombres.

Ortega is speaking to the Macrospherians' heart! What the Macrospherians most need is an *event* – instead of a kind of art – which will force the masses to inescapably recognize their stupidity and which will cause the minority of geniuses to understand their mission in regard to the dumb masses, so that society can return to the traditional division between the elites and the masses – but this time not in terms of wealth and power and privileges, but in terms of intelligence and wisdom (in my sense of the words). This is in fact how Ortega has always envisioned the elites.

10 September

While our (Macrospherian) goal is to return society to hierarchies and inequality such as were common in the past, different people have wanted different principles for organizing hierarchy and inequality. While we all agree that the "better" must be recognized as the "better" and be allowed to rule over the inferior, different people have different conceptions as to who is better and what the criterion is for deciding who is better. For Steve Bannon or the rightwing people like Black Pidgeon Speaks, it is wealth, income, and property: those who are better are those who own property and those who don't shouldn't have the right to vote. For me as well as for Ortega y Gasset, because we are philosopher, it is intelligence and wisdom – the ability to understand reality and people. (Hence John Stuart Mill believed that, if a person from the laboring masses should have one vote, the professor should have six votes.) My family members and the Secret Society women believe I'm inferior because I don't make money and receive welfare checks, whereas for me this is not relevant and I judge myself superior to them because I'm more intelligent and educated than they are – a quality which means nothing to them. It's worth quoting the way in which Leonard Bacon, a colonizationist, envisioned the matter (John Stauffer, *The Black Hearts of Men*, p. 104 – 5). As Bacon wrote in a letter to Gerrit Smith to denounce the abolitionists:

Throughout the report there *seems* to be something like an attempt to excite some of the basest and most dangerous elements of political malignancy. They that take the sword shall perish by the sword; and they that attempt to array the poor against the rich, the laborer against the employer, the country against the city, may find, too late, that they have evoked from the abyss demons whose might and malignity their art cannot control.

Stauffer continues:


For Bacon, associating with the lower classes and tampering with the social order threatened to turn sin loose from the passions of the heart. As a Congregational minister who taught at Yale, Bacon was anything but a perfectionist. He believed not only that slavery symbolized America's original sin, but that blacks embodied sin. Like most other colonizationists, he thought the only way blacks could be redeemed and reborn was through African colonization. He could not unburden himself from the concept of original sin, and thus embraced rigid dualities for rendering order and stability on society. Any attempt to dismantle these dualities "evoked from the abyss" the demons of the poor, the laborers, the uncivilized wilderness of the country, and blacks – which needed to be checked by the rich, the employer, the civilized city, and whites, who knew how [to] control their passions and demons. Allowing demons to escape from the abyss of people's hearts, Bacon warned, would unleash dark phantoms of sin that the "art" of abolitionists could not control.

This is the way in which a conservative in the nineteenth century decides who is better and what the criterion is: the orderliness of the bourgeois life makes the bourgeoisie superior and fit to rule. When the Macrospherians are about to succeed in reversing the egalitarian spirit of the current age, they will have to triumph over the other anti-egalitarians in the determination of who's superior and what the criterion is. The Macrospherians' design is basically Platonic or Confucian: the philosopher should be ranked the highest in society's hierarchy and rule.

15 September

In the past few days, watched "Dominion" (2018); "US-Mexican War" and its Spanish version "La Guerra Estados Unidos y Mexico"; and Manisha Sinha on A House Divided.

Then, watched Dawn Moncrief's presentation at Animal Rights Conference, Luxembourg (2019). The "Livestock Revolution": how meat-consumption worldwide will double between 2000 and 2050.



What we need is a new, more precise form of "central command" or "command economy" covering the whole planet: a central committee which calculates how much emission is permitted given climate change and how much meat-consumption is permitted globally in order to not exceed the emission permitted. (Emission caused by animal farming exceeds that caused by all forms of transportation combined.)