(Zur Genealogie der Moral)English translation by Walter Kaufmann
German text available at Projekt Gutenburg-DE
Summary and Commentary
Nietzsche's criticism of religions in general and of Christianity in particular is conditioned by the forgetfulness of the human religious experience (i.e. the animistic perspective) due to the de-animization of the cosmos that lays the basis for the age of science and modernity in which he grew up. Furthermore, his criticism of Christian morality is a reflection of the degeneration of Western philosophy. Thus, he really didn't understand at all Christianity or any other religion or ascetic forms, so that his critique here cannot be taken seriously as an "explanation of religion". For an ordinary reader the value of this otherwise enormously insightful treatise lies instead in its exposition of the psychological defense mechanism by which a person, frustrated by external oppression, becomes masochist, redirecting his natural instinct for outward expansion and freedom of movement and creation upon him- or herself, and his search for meaning, pleasure, and satisfaction in life into being oppressed and self-destruction. Nietzsche would like to reduce the entire ascetic enterprise of the human race to such masochist reversal of life functionings, but, in reality, ascetic religion, as we have seen, can be entirely explained through ancients' and primitives' functional, immature understanding of thermodynamics; the psychological mechanism described by Nietzsche below may or may not accompany this ancient understanding of thermodynamics to constitute the ascetic core of religion.
For us who would like to trace the evolution of human spiritual consciousness throughout history, this book of Nietzsche's has another value. It shows how the differentiation of consciousness can finally result in nihilism, in the disintegration of enlightenment inherited from the Axial age, in the breakdown of all notions of justice, in Thrasymachus' "might makes right" (in Plato's Republic) as the only value left. Nietzsche calls this the "will-to-power" of the "blond beast" (i.e. the lion). He is not wrong in isolating it as the most original human value, that admiration for masculine strength and physical prowess. One can find it among any of the "pre-moral" ("pre-civilized") peoples, such as among the Mongols of Ginghis Khan or the Huns of Attila as well as among the ancient Germans. But it is primarily due to despair that the Europeans attempted to recover this infantile instinct of humanity -- and Nietzsche here served as their prophet, articulating their sentiment clearly for them; and these Europeans soon infused amoral aggression, which this concept of will-to-power represents, into their erroneous theories of history and civilization, such as the "Aryan invasion" story, or a general model of the origin of civilizations, that they without exception descended from the amalgam between the invading violent illiterate masters and the invaded cultured agriculturalist slaves, the latest expression of which is still found in William McNeill's The Rise of the West. We all know what sentiment like this led to.
The core of the Genealogy is a genealogy of the present-day morality as invented by Christianity with its spirit of ressentiment: a genealogy of the Christian morality. But although it is a historical (diachronic) re-searching of the origin of Christianity, it does not tell the story of Christianity strictly according to its chronological sequence. Here the purpose is the reiteration of this story in the manner of a chronicle.
In the last section of this book Nietzsche remarks of man:
In the beginning was the suffering of man. Man was suffering in two ways: 1.) he was suffering; 2.) he was suffering from the lack of a meaning for his suffering.
The factual answer to "the crying question", "Why do I suffer?" is that the blond beast had conquered man.
A. The first stage of the history: blond beast's conquering of man
The blond beast was the first type of man. Originally, every human being on earth was a blond beast. He was the artist, the original, unelaborated form of Dionysus, who acted purely and exclusively instinctually or spontaneously, which is to say strictly according to "the law of life": the will to power. He was this instinctual Dionysus who did nothing but conquer, involuntarily as it were, and that means destroy and reform.
When the blond beast, this animal of cruelty without guilt, had, in the (self-) expression of its will-to-power -- that natural instinct for outward expansion and freedom of movement and creation is primitively expressed as an instinct toward cruelty -- conquered another, it created out of the conquered another, second type of man, the guilty type, by encasing the latter within the confines of the ruling structure it had created while conquering -- the enclosure called "society and peace" -- thus thwarting the external expression of that second species' will-to-power. The conquered or the encased, in the circumstances of its predicament (thwarting encasement), then developed within themselves "bad conscience", the consciousness of guilt, which is the will-to-power (i.e. the instinct toward cruelty) turned back against itself -- to exert cruelty on itself. The feeling of guilt is the function of reflexive cruelty.
The man of bad-conscience, this second man who was later to supplant the first to become "man-proper", began at the moment of encasement to suffer -- without knowing the reason why.
B. The revolt of the weak in values
The blond beast who had conquered and walled up the other with the invention of civilization (law), established himself as the aristocrat.
The value system of the aristocrat, pre-morality as it were, which was his self-definition, his way of distinguishing himself from the lower caste (the conquered), then followed the "rule for conceptual transformation," that a concept denoting political superiority should resolve itself into a concept denoting the superiority of the soul" (p. 31, Es 1, sect.6): good, the starting point of the aristocratic value system which ended in bad, following this rule became associated with the aristocracy and the character traits thereof: "a powerful physicality, a flourishing, abundant, even overflowing health, together with that which serves to preserve it: war, adventure, hunting, dancing [the habit of Dionysus], war games, and in general all that involves vigorous, free, joyful activity." ("... eine mächtige Leiblichkeit, eine blühende, reiche, selbst überschäumende Gesundheit, sammt dem, was deren Erhaltung bedingt, Krieg, Abenteuer, Jagd, Tanz, Kampfspiele und Alles überhaupt, was starkes, freies, frohgemuthes Handeln in sich schliesst.") These "the knightly-aristocratic value judgments [die ritterlich-aristokratischen Werthurtheile] presupposed" ("p.33, Es 1, sect.7).
The nineteenth century reader was asked here to try to temporarily suspend his or her experience of values formed out of the Christian transformation -- or the (first) axial philosophic transformation for that matter, whether Confucian, Buddhist, or Platonic -- of civilization and to say with Nietzsche of the tail-end of the aristocratic value spectrum, bad: "[bad: schlecht] originally designated the plain, the common man, as yet with no inculpatory implication and simply in contradistinction to the nobility." The un-inculpatoriness of this first human value system is the distinctive characteristic that merits the designation of "pre-morality".
The conquered and the walled-up, i.e. the weak, developed naturally, in the environmental confinement which blocked the outward expression of their will-to-power, an "impotent" hatred for their aristocratic masters, the most evil type of hatred of all, which Nietzsche designates as the "priestly vengefulness"; and undertook to overthrow their enemies by a "radical revaluation of their enemies' values," a reversal of the natural and dominant value system.
Nietzsche thus has a thoroughly negative evaluation of the morality of the age of civilization -- morality proper which is to supplant pre-morality -- in this case, the Christian enlightenment ethics of the axial age. He notes that hatred is the natural consequence of impotence, that is to say that hatred is the technique for pain-deadening that the will-to-power employs in desperation when, in face of the denial of its external expression (in the condition of impotence), it has caused itself too much pain.
The slave-morality (the first civilizational value system) differs in its internal arrangement from the aristocratic value system in that, firstly, it has as its head "good" but as its tail evil -- not merely "bad" -- with all the "inculpatory implications" attached to the concrete instances of "evil" (and, with these implications descriptively differentiative, "value" finally became inculpatory morality) and, secondly, that the head associates with the associates of the former tail and the tail with those of the former head:
Furthermore, morality follows a different direction in the derivation of its head and tail one from another than that followed by the aristocratic value-system.
What therefore was responsible for the generation of the culpable Evil (health) and of the good for that Evil (sickliness) was the perversion of derivation -- rather than the spontaneous discovery of the self: denial of the external, hatred, distaste for life -- only then, oneself, as an after-production, a side issue.
These psychological products (above-mentioned) of the inward expression of Life, of the will-to-power, constitute ressentiment, the second type of life-instinct for the second type of man, who is however not yet completed.
C. The attempt of the ascetic priest to complete the second man through the system of narcotics dit Christianity
Inculpatory morality, which is in fact hatred (toward the self and others and all), ressentiment, constitutes the nutritious soil in which Christianity takes its roots, according to Nietzsche. Not in the soil of enlightenment love, he thinks. But, then, not yet comes Christianity, he adds: Christianity as such is an ascetic ideal, the priestly ideal, the first "seriousness" forged, on the basis of ressentiment, by the ascetic priest for the sick of whom he was the leader (or the tamer or savior), as an effective narcotics.
l. Nietzsche first notes that the ascetic ideal is universal among humanity, seen working in all cultures at all epochs of history: the ascetic mode, a sort of sickness for Nietzsche, has been on the planet Earth the rule, rather than the exception.
That is, the only life-option open to them: recall that "he had no other physical body on which to use his cruelty than that little, insufficient nook permitted him in society: that of his own". Christianity, then, is that form of asceticism persisting in the Western Hemisphere.
If one asks, "How is it that asceticism should have become the rule of life?" Nietzsche has already given the response: "Because it is the greatest system of narcotics ever invented to relieve pain."
2. Nietzsche then provides the meaning (or function) of the ascetic ideal in the middle of the third essay (sect. 13). The origination of asceticism as he has laid out is:
Through a genealogy of Christianity it can be seen in the concrete, according to Nietzsche, how the ascetic ideal here subserves the preservation of life among the physiologically obstructed in Europe.
For Christianity was founded by the ascetic priest, the leader of the herd of the sick, in response to the need of the herd for a medication, both justificatory and pain-relieving, for their suffering, which is (again) their suffering from their reflexive cruelty in the aristocrats' imprisonment of their will-to-power.
3. The ascetic priest. The foundation of Christianity cannot have done without priesthood and the meaning thereto appertaining. Hence it is necessary to first consider the ascetic priesthood.
a.) The priest was "constituted" among the sick; he was one of the sick too.
One (serious?) look at the metaphysics on which the priestly ideal, or the priestly evaluation of life ( "the valuation the ascetic priest places on our life"), was based, unveils immediately that this valuation is perfectly identical with ressentiment, or cruelty-toward-oneself.
b.) In order to understand how priesthood was demanded as a necessity by the state of affairs it is necessary to be acquainted with the policy of the aristocrat (reiterated by Nietzsche as if merely his personal opinion on politics), that the sick, insofar as they constituted the greatest danger for the aristocrat, or for their health, and hence for the health and future of humanity, should be segregated from them, and barred from their sphere of living.
It is thus that the priest -- the proper physician, consoler, and savior of the sick -- was in demand. The transcendence of the sick in order to act reflexively for itself, to provide itself with medical treatment -- that is the raison d'être, the ultimate meaning, of priesthood: the priest is the third man.
D Christianity (an ascetic ideal and a creation of the creative ascetic priest) subserving the preservation of life among the physiologically obstructed (in Europe).
Now the physiological, and so medical, condition, having inevitably arisen in the sick when they had maltreated themselves too much -- the condition that the ascetic priest was assigned the duty to treat, with his medical expertise -- his knowledge of the working of the will-to-power: to seek "some living thing upon which [one] can ... vent [one's] affect, actually or in effigy"; which is: "the greatest attempt on the part of the suffering to win relief, anesthesia -- the narcotic they cannot help desiring to deaden pain of any kind" (p. 127).
As is depicted below, the will-to-power, in an effort to deaden the pain it has caused itself, now turns outward for a second time, in a second round toward externality, toward an external object upon which to release its effect: cruelty.
The second stage of the psychology of the second man
Hatred for the purpose of anesthesia
"Someone or other must be to blame for my feeling ill" (p. 127), by which saying the will-to-power, cruelty, worked thusly; these sick animals had been before oriented entirely toward the internal but are now turned again external, continuously maltreating themselves but at the same time looking for external sentient beings to maltreat, on whom to blame their pain (p. 127 - 128). The full configuration of ressentiment is thus seen: the hatred of the most evil kind came from self-hatred.
But the treatment-plan of the ascetic priest consisted in a re-wounding, a repetition of the first wounding by the blond beast, i.e. another forced inward-discharge of will-to-power!
The third stage of the psychology of the second man
The priestly medication for pain
The words that worked this alteration -- "you alone are to blame for yourself!" -- crystallized, according to Nietzsche, into the (religious) concepts of guilt, sin, sinfulness, and damnation (note: the brand names of medicine), which were natural to their (sickly) instincts and hence easy for them to learn: maltreated by themselves, the sickly already had a talent for bad conscience -- the consciousness (conscience) of guilt.
And these priestly words and concepts were produced with a view to priestly ends: "to render the sick to a certain degree harmless, to work the self-destruction of the incurable, to direct the ressentiment of the less severely afflicted sternly back upon themselves... and in this way to exploit the bad instincts of all sufferers [instincts for cruelty, on self and on others] for the purpose of self-discipline, self-surveillance, and self-overcoming" (p. 128). "The transcendence of the sickly!"
These priestly words (the religious concepts) for the purpose of the re-direction of ressentiment accumulated into a thick sediment of doctrines and practices called Christianity, Nietzsche says. As the medication for the sick, Christianity was not so much a cure as a re-wounding serving to console their pain, from the first wound, and now probably from the second wound as well -- that by Christianity itself ... in any case from their "feeling of physiological inhibition" (the will-to-power feeling itself inhibited). A palliative: the meaning of religion (i.e. the ascetic ideal) in general and of Christianity in particular.
And that subserves the preservation of life nonetheless!
This priestly genius (for palliation) has been immortalized in the three strategies the ascetic priest has invented for combating the feeling of displeasure (which came from the feeling of inhibition), all recognizable as the essentials of the Christian way-of-life.
a.) "This dominating sense of displeasure is combated, first, by means that reduce the feeling of life in general to its lowest point": "the attempt to win for man an approximation to what in certain animals is hibernation, in many tropical plants estivation, the minimum metabolism at which life will still subsist without really entering consciousness." Does not this technique -- the mastery of which requires courage, perseverance, and above all intensive training: training in hibernation -- does it not seem to one to be the general formula of religion or (in particular) asceticism? Is Nietzsche right about this? In this way one has obtained the many "trainings" so frequently seen in Christianity in particular and in world-religions in general: abstinence from women and the rejection of worldly instincts (i.e. the instincts for life) in general; Pascal's principle, cited by Nietzsche, il faut s'abêtir; moral "selflessness," and more. An astonishing amount of human energy has been expended to this end... of hibernation!
b.) "Much more common than this hypnotic muting of all sensitivity, of the capacity to feel pain... is a different training against states of depression which is at any rate easier: mechanical activity": sometimes referred to as "the blessings of work." "The alleviation [i.e. that for which the sufferer is to be trained] consists in this, that the interest of the sufferer is directed entirely away from his suffering -- that activity, and nothing but activity, enters consciousness, and there is consequently little room left in it for suffering." Now this works because "the chamber of human consciousness is small" (p.134; c.f. also the sections on man's natural "forgetfulness", Essay 2).
c.) "An even more highly valued means of combating depression is the prescribing of a petty pleasure that is easily attainable and can be made into a regular event... The most common form in which pleasure is thus prescribed as a curative is that of the pleasure of giving pleasure (doing good, giving, relieving, helping, encouraging, consoling, praising, rewarding)." Doing good to others -- a most celebrated variant of which is, as everyone knows, "love thy neighbor" -- works for pain-deadening because it is a slight excitement of the will-to-power ("the strongest, most life-affirming drive" -- or simply life itself); because doing good to others always entails a slight sense of power on the part of the helper, "the happiness of 'slight superiority,' involved in all doing good, being useful, helping, and rewarding..." (p.135). But caution: this extremely effective and highly successful -- and no doubt the most celebrated -- pain-relieving medication must be prescribed in the most cautious doses (and this the ascetic priest did): "otherwise [those treated with this medication] hurt one another, obedient, of course, to the same basic instinct [the same instinct that prompted them to help: the will-to-power]" (ibid.).
When considering the historical origins of Christianity one can readily see -- Nietzsche notes -- that the "will to mutual aid" ( i.e. the will-to-power prescribed in small doses for pain) naturally led up to "the formation of a herd, to community, to congregation": the infant form of the Christian community. "All the sick and sickly instinctively strive after a herd organization as a means of shaking off their dull displeasure and feeling of weakness: the ascetic priest divines this instinct and furthers it; whenever there are herds, it is the instinct of weakness that has willed the herd and the prudence of the priest that has organized it... [in contrast] the strong are as naturally inclined to separate as the weak are to congregate" (p.135 - 6).
"[T]he general muting of the feeling of life, mechanical activity, the petty pleasure, above all 'love of one's neighbor,' herd organization, the awakening of the communal feeling of power through which the individual's discontent with himself is drowned in his pleasure in the prosperity of the community -- these are, by modem standards, [the ascetic priest's] innocent means in the struggle with displeasure" (p.136).
d.) The ascetic priest's guilty means -- there is, in addition to the innocent ones listed above, this guilty one -- for deadening "dull, paralyzing, protracted pain" operates according to the principle of the orgy of feeling, that curative effect might be produced by a sudden, violent arousal in the sufferer of great affects: thus, what the orgies of feeling do, i.e. how they work and why they are effective as pain-relievers: "To wrench the human soul from its moorings, to immerse it in terrors, ice, flames, and raptures to such an extent that it is liberated from all petty displeasure, gloom, and depression as by a flash of lightning" (p.139).
The forms in which the orgy of feeling is prescribed: "Fundamentally, every great affect has this power, provided it explodes suddenly: anger, fear, voluptuousness, revenge, hope, triumph, despair, cruelty... always [however] under cover of a religious interpretation and justification."
But the chief form of the orgy of feeling was the exploited sense of guilt. The instinct for cruelty, the life-instinct in general terms, forced, in order to attain its necessary release, back upon itself, now the only niche of existence permitted it by the blond beast -- this raw guilt (seen earlier) the ascetic priest undertook to exploit by molding it as does an artist into a definite form, sin: suffering from himself (from his own will-to-power) the sick had been thirsting for remedies and narcotics, above all reasons for his suffering -- "reasons relieve" (p.140) -- thus he "at last takes counsel with one who knows hidden things, too -- and behold! he receives a hint, he receives from his sorcerer, the ascetic priest, the first hint as to the 'cause' of his suffering: he must seek it in himself, in some guilt, in a piece of the past, he must understand his suffering as a punishment."
It is with this guilty narcotics that Nietzsche returns us, having completed a loop, to the core of that elaborate, highly systematic regiment of narcotics dit "Christianity": this core that is the doctrine of (even original) sin, constituted in the creative words ("you alone are to blame for yourself") of the ascetic priest uttered for the purpose of pain-deadening, but resulting in a re-wounding and for which the above-listed innocent means are mere supplement. That the sick, the discontent, should vent, for release, for pain-palliation, their instinct on themselves, once more -- rather than on others -- such is the raison d'être of sin.
Moreover, it is not until this second wounding of the ascetic priest has completed the constitution of the weak into the "sinner" ("from now on he is like a hen imprisoned by a chalk line. He can no longer get out of this chalk circle: the invalid has been transformed into 'the sinner'" [p.141]) that the second type of man, the man of bad-conscience, of ressentiment, has reached his full potential, has developed his talent for self-torture to the maximum of his capability.
E Nietzsche's general assessment of the priestly medication
In respect to the effectiveness of the priestly medication (Christianity in general and its" guilty core" in particular), Nietzsche admits this much: "the old depression, heaviness, and weariness were indeed overcome through this system of procedures; life again became very interesting: awake, everlastingly awake, sleepless, glowing, charred, spent and yet not weary... one no longer protested against pain, one thirsted for pain, 'more pain! more pain!' the desire of his [the ascetic priest's] disciples and initiates has cried for centuries" (p. 141).
But the question decisive to the assessment of a medication needs still answering, the question of benefit which contemporary doctors and psychiatrists too often forget: Has the system ever benefited any of the sick (or the patients)?
1.) "If one intends [the word 'benefit'] to convey that such a system of treatment has improved men, I shall not argue: only I should have to add what 'improved' signifies to me... 'tamed,' 'weakened,' 'discouraged,' 'made refined,' 'made effete,' 'emasculated' (thus almost the same thing as harmed)."
2.) But "it invariably makes them sicker...; one need only ask psychiatrists what happens to patients who are methodically subjected to the torments of repentance, states of contrition, and fits of redemption."
Nietzsche then states his conclusion concerning the effect of the ascetic ideal as a medication:
In the philosophy of Nietzsche we see how Western philosophy -- whose goal since the Hellenic beginning is to bring order to the soul, either so as to prepare it for major salvation after life or, at least, for minor salvation as happiness in this life -- has degenerated down to its lowest. The glorification of the pre-morality of the unenlightened nomads ("master morality") and the corresponding "transvaluation" (sneering) of conventional morality passed down from the axial age as "slave morality" recall indeed the "inverted philosophy of existence" (in Voegelin's words) of Callicles in Plato's Gorgias (or "justice as the advantage of the stronger" of Polymarchus in the Republic): Nietzsche is doing to Christianity exactly what Callicles is doing to Socrates' philosophon. Callicles' "philosophy" is:
Existence must not be interpreted in terms of the Eros towards the Agathon [which in the case of Christianity is agape towards and from the transcendent God], but in terms of the stronger or weaker physis. Nature is the fundamental reality, and the victorious assertion of the physis [here, the primitive instinct called the will-to-power] is the meaning of life. The order of the soul, which for Socrates originates in the eroticism of the mystic [and in the Christian case, in faith and love], is brushed aside as a convention invented by the weaker natures to restrain the stronger ones [here, by ressentiment]. Nobody prefers the suffering of injustice [which the Christians prefer] to its doing; those who say so are of a slavish character; no man of a lordly nature [here, the blond beast] would agree (483 a - c). This is... the deliberate transvaluation of values from an existential counterposition. Callicles knows that he can maintain it only if he can invalidate the Socratic position. With his distinction of physis and nomos he strikes at the heart of Socratic eroticism: "You pretend only that you are searching for the truth! As a matter of fact, you are propagating what holds a vulgar appeal for the masses!" (482 e). Polus was still in despair: how could a man entertain such fantastic proposition as Socrates [that he'd prefer suffering injustice to doing injustice; i.e. the lot of the conquered to the lot of blond beast in the present case]? Callicles knows the motive. Socrates [likened to the ascetic priest here appealing to the second man of ressentiment]... is a demagogue who seeks favor by a pretense to respectability. Callicles is in the know of ideologies; he [just like Nietzsche] gets behind the other man and reveals the dubious motive behind the façade of ideas... (Order and History, vol. II, Plato and Aristotle, p. 32).
Nietzsche is thus Callicles re-appearing.
In this way Nietzsche turns Christian enlightened morals into "slave morality". The amiticia between God and human which forms the human soul and then the human community in order (of which humility, self-abasement, and deep empathy for others are reflections) -- along with the motivation toward asceticism: the salvational state of the soul -- is either forgotten, misunderstood, or denied, taken as a slavish weakness or deceptive device to restrain the strong. This is exactly what Plato has had to fight against among his corrupted contemporaries of politicians, rhetoricians, and sophists, and what we have to fight against again today. It results from, as analyzed in the case of Plato, the complete eclipse of the highest component of the soul by the lowest component.
That said, it is true that the Christian enlightened ethics could have degenerated among the many into the slave morality Nietzsche criticizes. Nonetheless, to find positive values in On the Genealogy of Morals, we should focus our attention instead on Nietzsche's enormous talent in the understanding of human psychology, or psychopathology. Sentient beings, whether animals or humans, have all been seen engaged in self-torment, gaining satisfaction in being oppressed or oppressing themselves, when they cannot direct themselves outward, to venture, to exploit, to run free, to exercise mastery over the environment, and gain satisfaction that way -- the natural way. A dog that has been abused and caged up by its owner curls up and wallows in self-pity; a feet-bound, immobilized woman in pre-modern China that served her master as just one concubine among many developed hatred of her self and for her own kind (womankind) as inferior, delighted in self-sacrifice for, and masochist devotion to, the master, thinking that the female kind deserved such lowly fate because of their natural inferiority and sinfulness; a teenager who had been horribly abused by his step-father during childhood, even witnessing his sister being beaten to death, barricaded himself under the table in a psychiatric ward and refused to talk for four years (see Torey Hayden's Murphy's Boy, 1983); someone with borderline personality disorder who was also abused and locked up during childhood cuts her- or himself with razor blade in order to derive satisfaction from self-destruction. These are all instances of the reflexivity of the will-to-power. Even pigs that are caged up in horrendously cramped condition in the factory farm and bite and eat each other out of frustration can be taken as manifesting this reflexivity. In another way, one can interpret this as a defense mechanism: if a sentient being cannot gain, or is prevented from gaining, satisfaction and fulfillment from performing what it is made to perform -- venturing, running free, etc. -- then, to escape from the pain that results from it, it learns to find satisfaction and fulfillment precisely in self-confinement and self-destruction. Satisfaction and fulfillment nonetheless. Nietzsche's nomos, or perspective, was modern, de-animized, structural, so he could not understand religion and (classical) philosophy; but human psychology is something that has remained constant since time immemorial, not subject to the differentiation of consciousness which affects the cognitive, not the emotive, aspect of humanity. In The Elementary Structures of Kinship Lévi-Strauss describes seeing, while among the "primitives" in South America, a man always curled up in the corner, immersed in sadness, and fed only by his sister. The villagers explained that he was a bachelor.