Scientific Enlightenment, Div. One Book 2: Human Enlightenment of the First Axial 2.B.1. A genealogy of the philosophic enlightenment in classical Greece Chapter 12: Plato's Phaedo as the Platonic second mode of salvation ACADEMY | previous section | Table of Content | next section | GALLERY

copyright © 2003, 2004 by Lawrence C. Chin. All rights reserved.

In this way Socrates defines philosophy, which is thus (1) purification of the soul (katharsis, katharmos); (2) the way to Truth; (3) the way to dwelling with the divine Eternal after death, after the release of the soul from the body. And these, in human life time, amount to the practice of dying and being dead. All this is thoroughly Pythagorean, i.e. the second mode, except that it is now explicitly recognized as "being dead". Plato is here bringing the Pythagorean second mode to its final perfection.

Recall then what specific form the second mode has taken on with Orphism and (later) Pythagoreanism, the form of the second mode specific to Hellas: (1) Salvation is conservation of the soul back into the conserved substrate. (2) The conserved substrate is not simply the conservation of material (like the modern conservational law, the conservation of energy), but also of order. The order that is so conserved, i.e. never changes, is the ingrained order of the cosmos, i.e. the laws of existence, the laws of nature, which for Neo-Pythagoreanism are of a mathematical and numerological nature, but which Plato is to generalize into a system of "forms" (eidoi). (3) The laws of existence are "true" in this sense of being eternal and ingrained: the conserved reality. (4) The soul is originally identical with this Truth, before its corruption through embodiment in flesh, before its fallenness into the material world. (5) To be saved, to be conserved back, to "return home", the soul needs to rid itself of this corruption, this embodiment, which blocks off its original identity with Truth (the ingrained structure of the cosmos), which, that is, prevents its conservation. But to so rid itself of corruption or embodiment (purification) means "being dead".

Now how does this embodiment block off the soul's original identity? How is the way to Truth (aletheia), to the soul's original identity, to its conservation, assured through the practice of dying? Because the body hinders access to Truth. The body offers endless distractions such as the needs for nourishment, illness, desires, fears, etc., and the satisfaction of the bodily needs compels one to gain wealth, and consequently to fight and be engaged in wars for wealth, etc. The body follows the necessity of consumption and defecation ordained by the second law of thermodynamics and so through the body the second law pressures us to consume and defecate and reproduce, to therefore take the un-true temporal things as true -- these corruptions of Truth, of eidoi -- and to avoid the Truth. In other words, or preliminarily speaking, this necessity enslaves one to the care or service (therapeia) of the body and leaves one no leisure for philosophy, the care or service (purification) of the soul. Consequently one, or rather the soul, must rid itself of the body, and, thus by itself, the soul can view the objects themselves (auta ta pragmata) -- which, behind the temporal things, are the true reality -- acquiring wisdom in this way -- and this can never happen perfectly until death, the complete release of the soul from the body. Before death, one must have as little to do with the body as possible, subjecting oneself to or associating oneself with its desires and needs as little as possible. (This incidentally leads to the order of the soul, or minor salvation; below.) In this way one sees reality closely (objects by themselves) and -- the structure of reality being divine manifestation, the ingrained order eternally conserved, the original identity of the soul -- communes with it, thus staying pure; then after death (release) the soul will rejoin the divine Eternal Conservedness and be forever therein conserved instead of undergoing senseless continuing reincarnations. Truth (alethes, things by themselves, the divine manifestation in and as the structure of reality) is then salvation. "For never will it be permissible [themitos: sanctioned by law] for the impure to fasten onto the pure." (mh kaqarwi gar kaqarou efaptesqai mh ou qemiton hi. 67 b 2) And this "seeing things by themselves" -- Truth -- is wisdom (phronesin).

Certainly then salvation (of the soul) depends crucially on the immortality of the soul; if there were no soul after death, after "disembodiment", what would be the point of worrying about its conservation? For proof of this Socrates first appeals to tradition, to an "ancient saying" (palaioV logoV) -- certainly Orphism or Pythagoreanism -- concerning the transmigration and reincarnation of the soul: that the souls of human beings, upon the death of the person, enter Hade, stay there, then reincarnate into living beings (being born at the time, presumably); that, therefore, "the living are born from the dead and from nowhere else" (70 d 4: oti oudamoqen alloqen gignontai oi zwnteV h ek twn teqnewtwn.) Though with later Pythagoreanism philosophical speculation proper has begun, the mythic element still survives here: the Hade is part of the myth. As a philosopher Socrates must have thought that myth is correct in a vague, approximate, metaphorical way, that "something like this" (Hade as the station for the souls of the dead) is true.

Justifying the tradition: first argument for the immortality of the soul. From the observation that all things come to be from their opposites, e.g. that when a thing enlarges it comes to be such from being smaller before (70 e 7), or that "being awake comes to be from sleeping" (71 d), hence and especially that the dead comes to be from the living and living from the dead, the traditional myth should be correct. Implicit here is the supposition of the balance of natural processes, this Anaximandrean justice, the necessity of restoration to equilibrium. "Will nature (physis) be lame in this respect?" (71 e 9) "If there were not these things paying back [giving back] to those things [opposites], as if revolving in cycle (ei gar mh aei antapodidoih ta etera toiV eteroiV gignomena, wsperei kuklwi periiota) -- if, instead, coming-to-be [genesis] were something linear [straight: euqeia tiV] [process] from one thing to its opposite only, without any bending back to the original thing or making reversal, do you realize that all things would end up having the same form [schema]: the same fate would befall them, and they would cease from coming to be? (72 b; all'euqeia tiV eih h genesiV ek tou eterou monon eiV to katantikru kai mh anakamptoi palin epi to eteron mhde kamphn poioito, oisq'oti panta teleutwnta to auto schma an scoih kai to auto paqoV an paqoi kai pausaito gignomena;) E.g. if sleeping does not reverse back to waking up then all would end up sleeping as the final, forever state. "If all things that partake of life were to die, but when they 'd died, the dead remained in that form [schemati], and didn't come back to life, wouldn't it be necessary that everything would end up dead and nothing would live? (72 c 5; ou pollh anagkh teleutwnta panta teqnanai kai mhden zhn;)

This, as the Anaximandrean justice, is the application of the first law of thermodynamics (which implies recycling), but on the wrong level -- and this is where the problematic nature of this argument may appear to a modern scientist. This cycling -- the genesis of one thing from its opposites -- is indeed necessary on the level of the structure, as for example in the subatomic world, where a proton may split into a pion of positive charge (p⁺) and a neutron both of which then can re-combine to form the original proton; or a pion of negative charge (p^-) may split into an antiproton and a neutron both of which then re-combine into the original pion of negative charge; or from the vacuum a proton, antiproton, and a pion may pop into being and then be reconserved back to the vacuum; or from gamma ray electron and positron may materialize only to annihilate each other again in a burst of gamma ray. These transformations into the opposites and then reversals back to the original are regular processes in the subatomic world because of the law of conservation. In the macroscopic world, the living only comes from the dead in the sense of the fundamental processes of ecosystem. Specifically, of the two fundamental processes of ecosystem, energy flow and chemical cycling, it is only the latter which is complete recycling due to the law of conservation, whereas, due to the second law of thermodynamics, energy is always lost (in the form of heat) from the biosphere which thus depends on the constant resupply of energy from the sun. Chemical recycling involves mainly carbon, nitrogen, and phosphorous. Decomposition of the dead by the microbes (detrivores, mostly bacteria and fungi) -- which is the breakdown of the organic materials that make up the dead organism to inorganic compounds of carbon, nitrogen, phosphorous -- recycles these back into the soil or air from where they are then re-incorporated into plants which then come into the stomach of the pregnant animal eating them and which then pass into the constitution of the fetus... (C.f. Campbell, Michell, and Reece, Biology, 2nd ed., p. 710- 717) To be sure, part of the food molecules ingested are oxidized during cellular respiration as fuel for making ATP -- i.e. used as energy -- and only another part is used to construct the components of the cells with the energy released in cellular respiration: this is biosynthesis. Together, these are "two aspects of metabolism that are central to life: the energy-harvesting process of cellular respiration and the biosynthetic pathways used to construct all parts of the cell". (Ibid., p. 105) In the macroscopic world, "the living coming from the dead" thus is traced from chemical recycling of the dead by decomposers to the biosynthesis in the pregnant animal. In any case it is always the underlying structures which are conserved and recycled. Socrates, on the other hand, because he knows nothing of the recycling of the structures just adumbrated, is applying the law of conservation to functional entities like life or soul, which are then supposedly always conserved back into the underlying field from which to emerge again. This carries us back to the genesis of the conviction in the immortality of the soul from the conservation of consciousness, since the first awakening of Homo sapiens sapiens to the (thermodynamic) structure of the universe. Examination of Socrates' (Plato's) "argument" against our present day scientific knowledge is important because it reveals the experiential background which motivates Plato's conviction in the transcendence of the soul: the experience of the underlying conservation behind all natural processes.

The second "argument" to justify the tradition (as proof for the immortality of the soul) concerns the nature of learning (mathesis) as recollection (anamnesis). This conception of learning is derived from the presentation of the so-called Platonic forms, which serves here not simply as justification for the immortality of the soul but also to delineate the structure and nature of reality, which has the Pythagorean flavor of the degeneration of the divine eternal down to the temporal corrupt existence through material embodiment.

Perception: "If someone, on seeing a thing, or hearing it... not only recognizes that thing, but also thinks [ennohshi] of something else, which is the object not of the same knowledge but of another... he's been "reminded" [anamnesthe] of the object of which he has got the thought." (73 d) This "reminding" or remembering (anamnesis) occurs either along the axis of metaphor or that of metonymy. (Metaphor is relation of similarity [and by extension opposition], and metonymy relation of contiguity. In a representational/ communicational process, metaphor has to do with selection of units and metonymy with combination of the units selected into the communicational event. E.g. When dressing, one chooses among many head gears [hat, baseball cap, toque, bonnet, hood] the hat to wear, then the shirt among many kinds of upper dress, then the pants among shorts and skirts, etc. The hat is related to other head gears by metaphor or similarity, and to shirts or pants by metonymy or contiguity. This is structural linguistics, first noted by Roman Jakobson, e.g. his "Two Aspects of Language: Metaphor and Metonymy" in European Literary Theory and Practice, p. 119; then adopted by Lacan, c.f. Anika Lemaire, Jacques Lacan, Ch. 2) In terms of metonymy: "Someone seeing Simmias is often reminded of Cebes" (The two have been frequently seen together.) In terms of metaphor: "On seeing Simmias depicted, to be reminded of Simmias himself." The "Platonic forms" proceed from the axis of metaphor: there is "equalness" itself (ison) of which we are reminded on seeing a log or stone equaling to another log or stone. "I don't mean a log to a log, or a stone to a stone, or anything else of that sort, but some further thing beyond all those, the equal itself [auto to ison]: are we to say that there is such or not?" (famen pou ti einai ison, ou xulon legw xulwi oude liqon liqwi oud'allo twn toioutwn ouden, alla para tauta panta eteron ti, auto to ison. fwmen ti einai h mhden;)

The answer to the question: Where did one get the knowledge (episteme) of "equalness?" will reveal both the structure of reality and the immortality of the soul.

Did one get this knowledge from things that are equal? "Wasn't it from the things we were just mentioning: on seeing logs or stones or other equal things, wasn't it from those that we thought of that [i.e. equalness], it being different from them?" (ar'ouk ex wn nundh elegomen, h xula h liqouV h alla atta idonteV isa, ek toutwn ekeino enenohsamen, eteron on toutwn; 74 b 5)

The emphasis here is on: equalness is not equal things.

"With regard to the instances in the logs and equal [things: toiV isoiV]... do they appear to us to be equal in the same way as is the thing itself, that which is equal[ness]? [ara fainetai hmin outwV isa einai wsper auto to o estin ison;] Or do they fall short of it at all in being like the equal, or not? [h endei ti ekeinou twi toiouton einai oion to ison, h ouden;] (74 d 5) "Then whenever anyone, on seeing something [ti], thinks, 'this thing that I now see seeks to be like another reality [some other of beings, allo ti twn ontwn], but falls short [endei: is wanting], and cannot be such like that other, but is rather inferior [fauloteron: lighter, easier, trifler], do we agree that it is necessary that the person who thinks that happen to have previously seen [proeidota: fore-seen] that other he says it tries to resemble but falls short of? [endeesterwV: of lesser degree]" (74 d 10)

Since the "equal" itself (to auto ison) of which the equal things (ta isa) remind does not exist in empirical sense-perception but only is reminded of therein, it must have been acquired ("seen") before the beginning of sense perception, i.e. before birth. Same with the other such so-called forms. "Now if, having got it before birth, we were born in possession of it, did we know [epistametha], both before birth and as soon as we were born, not only the equal, the larger and the smaller, but all others of such sort? Because our present discourse [logos] concerns the beautiful itself, and the good itself, and just and holy [hosiou: divine law, law of nature], no less than the equal; in fact, as I say, it concerns everything on which we set this seal, 'that which is' ['the what is', to o esti], in the question we ask and in the answer we give [i.e. in the dialectical process]. And so it is necessary [anagkaion] for us to have acquired knowledges of all these before birth." (75 d)

"That which is" will later on be called eidos, "the seen", idea or forms.

Learning (mathesis) then is remembering (anamnesis) or "being reminded" (anamimnhiskesqai) of "that which is" which is forgotten (lhqen as apobolhn episthmhV "throwing away or loss of knowledge"). Or in other words the regaining of knowledge belonging to us. The experiential base of the forgottenness of "that which is" must be the observation that people are unconsciously knowing it ("equalness" is the condition of possibility for the perception of "equal things" -- so that insofar as people see anything at all they must have always already known these "forms") but not consciously, because they find it difficult to discuss or explicitate it in words (just as everyone speaks a language and yet finds it difficult, prior to education, to give a full account of the grammar of the language -- rules regarding parts of speech, syntax, etc. -- although he or she must know this grammar unconsciously by the very fact of speaking).

The knowledge of "that which is" then implies the existence of the soul prior to entering into human form (prin einai en anqrwpou eidei) and apart from the body; and at that time it possessed wisdom (phronesin), i.e. knowledge of the eternal "that which is". The second argument therefore ultimately establishes the identity between soul and the conserved ingrained structure of reality.

This is the second type of salvation, the Orphic-Pythagorean type, and it is arrived at in the discourse (logos) by making a "hypothesis" (upoqesiV) to explain why perception is possible: the hypothesis of the "forms", by consequence the fleeting memory thereof, and by consequence the immortality (or at least pre-existence before embodiment) of the soul. (o de peri thV anamnhsewV kai maqhsewV logoV di'upoqesewV axiaV apodexasqai eirhtai. "The logos concerning recollection and learning is said via a hypothesis worthy of acceptance." 92 d 6) Now hupothesis means: "that which is placed under", "that which is assumed".

(The difference between Plato's use of anamnesis and mine is that the memory of the first law of thermodynamics is gained and lost at the same time, the time of Wachsein, and only becomes transparent in scientific formulations which stabilize and explicitate this memory once and for all. Here is not assumed any existence of this memory prior to embodiment.)

The nature of the soul is explicated by Socrates in response to the popular fear (related by Simmias and Cebes) that the soul might disperse in air after exiting the body. This is skepticism of our "primal scene."

(1) Only a composite thing is liable to break up and disperse in this way, i.e. "to break up at points at which it was put together" (78 c 1: diaireqhnai tauthi hiper suneteqh.) and material things (like equal things or beautiful things) are composite by nature (sunteqentoV, sunqetwi onti fusei). The soul is non-composite (asunqeton).

(2) Composite things are temporal, always varying and never constant: ta de allot'allwV kai mhdepote kata tauta, they are never as themselves/ according to themselves.

Non-composite things are eternal, constant and never varying: aper aei kata tauta kai wsautwV ecei, "those which are always as themselves/ according to themselves and in the same manner." (78 c 6)

(3) The eternal is "that which is", "that each which is", auto ekaston o estin, "being itself" auth h ousia, to on which: "wsautwV aei ecei kata tauta, "is always in the same manner and according to itself." "That which never admits of any change whatever" "mh pote metabolhn kai hntinoun endecetai. This are these "forms", "equal itself", "beautiful itself", "that each itself which is" (auto to ison, auto to kalon, auto ekaston o estin. 78 d.); "being uni-form according to itself", monoeideV on auto kaq'auto.

The temporal are "the many beautiful things, such as human beings or horses or cloaks or anything else at all of that kind" or the many equal things, or "all things bearing the same name as those [beautiful or equal things]." (h iswn h kalwn h pantwn twn ekeinoiV omwnumwn.) These are "never according to themselves at all, never the same either in relation to themselves or to one another." (oute auta autoiV oute allhloiV oudepote.. oudamwV kata tauta. 78 d 10 - e 4.)

(4) The temporal things are the visible or sensible things. "These things you can touch and see and sense with other senses [aisthesin]."

The eternal are those "which you can lay hold of by no other way than logos of the intellect [i.e. linguistic thinking or discourse: otwi pot'an allwi epilaboio h twi thV dianoiaV logismwi]"; which are "invisible and not-seen" (aidh, ouc orata; 79 a 1- 4.)

So the body is temporal, visible, see-able (oraton). The soul is eternal and un-seen (aideV). Again, the original identity of the soul with the conserved ingrained structure of reality.

There is here a Heraclitean corruption of the soul by the body: "Whenever the soul uses the body to 'study' ['look': skopein] anything, either by seeing or hearing or any other sense it is dragged by the body towards objects that are never constant [according to themselves; tote men elketai upo tou swmatoV eiV ta oudepote kata tauta econta] and it wanders about, confused, dizzy, as if drunk, because of being fastened onto such [wandering] things [auth planatai kai tarattetai kai eiliggiai wsper mequousa, ate toioutwn efaptomenh]." (79 c 1 - 10) In other words, the fascination with the world of the senses, with the empirical reality, creates disorder in the soul (wandering), that is, injustice. We can hardly forget that all the wanderings in the world of manifold things, moreover, often arouse desires of wanting, jealousy, unhealthy obsessiveness and so on which further create disorders in the soul.

"Whereas whenever it studies [i.e. looks] alone by itself [itself according to itself: otan de ge auth kaq'authn skophi], it departs yonder ["there": ekeise] towards that which is pure and eternal [aei] and immortal and unvarying [in the same manner: wsautwV], and being of the same kin with it [wV suggenhV ousa autou], comes to be always next to it [aei met'ekeinou te gignetai], whenever it has come to be alone by ['according to'] itself, and whenever it may do so; then it has ceased from its wandering and, when it is about those [things] which are always according to themselves, it is always in the same manner [kai peri ekeina aei kata tauta wsautwV ecei], because of its fastening onto [efaptomenh] things of a similar kind; and this condition [pathema] of it is called 'wisdom' [phronesis], is it not?" (79 d) This "coming to be with the eternal and unvarying (always-according-to-itself) during life time makes the soul itself likewise unvarying and so not-wandering. This is an ordered soul, and the primordial sense of justice, i.e. a person of such soul is a "just person". This is the condition I call minor salvation, because such non-wandering, i.e. non-attachment to the possession and consumption of fanciful things around (and, in the case of men, of women), makes life easier. After life such just soul gets to rejoin that unvarying, self-according eternal and be conserved therein: salvation of the second mode. The implication is that it would no longer be dispersed among things, i.e. in spatiality, in addition to being no longer temporal. This is the permanent negation of wandering (planetai) associated with the second law, a negation through eternal conservation without change.

Plato (Socrates) refers to this eternal conservation in a mythical way as "going to the Hades properly so called" (i.e. Aidou spelled the same as "un-seen"), "by the side of the good and wise god" (para ton agaqon kai fronimon qeon; 80 d 7). This is possible because it is separated, upon death, in purity (kaqara apallatthtai), i.e. "trailing nothing of the body with it, since it had no avoidable commerce with it during life." (80 e 5)

This conservation is described as happiness (eudaimon), release of the soul from wandering and folly (anoias), from fears and wild lusts (agriwn erwtwn), and other evils of human existence, which, insofar as all these are functions of the body relating to its needs or desires for consumption, defecation, and reproduction (for further consumption), are part of the effects of the second law of thermodynamics. Fascination with the empirical world, looking for things rather than the form of things, and the satisfaction of bodily desires and functions through them, is therefore just an expression of worldly existence, i.e. existence as open-dissipative structure -- the material meaning of life -- with, moreover, the spatial and temporal limitations placed on it. The identification made here is: worldly existence = second law = satisfaction of the body = primordial guilt (spatial and temporal limitation) = injustice (disorder in the soul: dispersion and wandering around); whereas existence in the divine (in life or after life) = first law = clarity of mind in regard to the structure of reality = justice (order in the soul) = salvation as eternal conservation after life.

One notices that a soul's having nothing to do with the body during life time is the essence of asceticism. If one understands why Plato links minor salvation (ascetic non-engagement with the body's desires but sole engagement with the abstract structure of reality [eidos]) with eternal salvation (conservation within the divine substratum of being, never having to be sucked back into the material world of the flesh again) then one would have understood why salvational traditions all around the world tend to veer toward asceticism (abstention from satisfaction of bodily desires). For the fact that life is easier without attachment to the material meaning of life (consumption) does not exhaust the entire experiential content of minor salvation, but embedded within it is the ancient (functional) experience of the thermodynamics of consciousness as order-formation.

While in Phaedo the emphasis is on the salvational mode and the explication of the eternal behind the temporal, empirical reality and minor salvation is touched upon only in relation to eternal salvation, in the Republic Plato shifts focus onto minor salvation for its own sake. Within the dialogue with Glaucon about whether justice (dikaiosunh) is desirable in itself without concern for the reward ("wages", misqoV) and reputation (doxa) it may beget -- that is, should justice be done even if no one and no god would know about it -- the question posed to Socrates is as: epeidh oun wmologhsaV twn megistwn agaqwn einai dikaiosunhn, a twn te apobainontwn ap'autwn eneka axia kekthsqai, polu de mallon auta autwn, oion oran, akouein, fronein, kai ugiainein dh, kai os'alla agaqa gonima thi autwn fusei all'ou doxhi estin, tout'oun auto epaineson dikaiosunhV, o auth di'authn ton econta oninhsin kai adikia blaptei, misqouV de kai doxaV pareV alloiV epainein. (367 d) "Now since you agreed that justice is among the greatest goods -- those that are worth possessing for their consequences, but much more for themselves, such as seeing, hearing, thinking, and also being healthy, and all the other goods that are fruitful by their own nature and not by opinion [seeming] -- praise this of justice, that justice is profitable to the [soul] having it and injustice does harm, and leave wages and reputation aside for others to praise." It is manifest here that in the functional perspective -- and still in today's structural perspective -- consciousness, the collective state of self-awareness to which seeing, hearing, thinking, etc. refer, is taken as an extreme instance of order stabilized away from the equilibrium state of the environment, an extreme instance of "running up-hill" within the general thermodynamic universe that is necessarily always running downward because of the second law, and for this reason it is extremely precious and valued. In the modern anthropic perspective, for example, consciousness is still regarded as the region of the universe with the most concentrated degree of order -- that point of the universe at which this universe itself becomes conscious of itself. Justice, as the order of this consciousness (= the soul) is consequently precious and valued in the same way, as all orders are, including health (the order of the body), because they are structures going against the arrow of time. This is how Socrates is later on going to defend the desirability of justice in itself -- keeping in mind, of course, that it is also the salvational state of the soul. On the other hand, as already said in regard to the pre-philosophical, still half-shamanistic concern with the purification of the soul, the prolonged contact of this breath-soul-consciousness (the most ordered system or "local concentration") with earthly matter would cause the former to be more and more dispersed among (i.e. to reach equilibrium with) the latter which -- as material -- is experienced as the dissoluted, equilibrium state of the external environment that is running downward. Plato has evidently, in his refinement of the general Orphic-Pythagorean second mode of salvation, inherited this concern for the "purification of the soul" (i.e. stabilization of it away from the equilibrium of the material world) from the latter and expressed it here. Indulgence in bodily pleasures -- in the pleasures of consumption and reproduction, in the material meaning of life -- leading to the dispersion, to the planetonicity of the soul, thus also means that the soul is reaching equilibrium with the material environment, which prevents its eternal conservation. Even with Plato the quantitative equilibrium which is really Conservation is not distinguished from qualitative equilibrium so that the macroscopic order (self-consciousness of the open dissipative structure), which today is regarded precisely as the consequence of the non-linear entropic running-downward of the material world continuously reaching equilibrium, is "mis-taken" (so to speak) as the function of Conservation (through the identification of it and the ingrained order of the cosmos as the conserved reality: Plato's shift from the Ionic concern with the [conservation of] materiality/ existentiality toward that with the [conservation of] essentiality), with the consequent thinking that its stabilization away from material equilibrium would result in its eternal conservation in just the order that it is. But this is not all that invalidated by modern science, since away from the macroscopic order of dissipative structures an order inherent in the conserved substratum of all matter (energy) and independent of the second law has been discovered in physics -- those "laws of nature" of the GUT and superstrings: the "essentiality" -- which shows up as soon as -- or rather just as -- symmetry breaks at lowered temperature, and which, as to be seen, is exactly the modern parallel of the Platonic forms. The only question remains if one can achieve "salvation" through the study of physics.

That the ascetic non-engagement with the body and the study of the structure of reality (eidos -- or laws of physics in today's perspective) has to be a continuous effort -- i.e. a life-style: the philosophical life -- in order to maintain the concentration of the soul and its stabilization away from the equilibrium state of the material world (including the body) around because consciousness itself is subject to entropic disintegration can be further illuminated by the thermodynamic meaning of memory (or of mind more generally) which is, in Stephen Hawking's words, associated with the "psychological arrow of time". He explains this with the simpler example of computer memory instead of human memory; but the principle is the same.

Throughout all traditions of the second mode, the learning of, and philosophic reflection on, the structure and nature of reality is associated with major salvation after life and minor salvation in this life (save for the Daoist, for whom eternal-major salvation is immanently contained within, i.e. undifferentiated from, minor salvation). Thus so are the Pythagoreans, Plato here, Upanishadic Hindus, Buddhists. As said, order is valued because it is precious and the condition of existence and moreover gives meaning to existence, as thermodynamic equilibrium -- lack of information and structure -- is meaningless. The learning of the structure of reality, just as in the case of the computer memory, is pumping energy into the otherwise disordered state of memory to make order out of it: this is the experience which Socrates here describes with respect to the soul's studying (looking at), itself by itself, reality itself: the experience of "justice", the "just soul", "wisdom" (phronesis). It is valued, also, for its preciousness and meaningfulness (it contains "structure", "information", i.e. disequilibrium or dissimilarity from one part to the next). The learned state of the mind (soul in order) is valued, in short, because it is harder to achieve, like rolling the ball uphill. Indulgence in sensory and bodily pleasures (entertainment shows, drinks, food, sex) -- consumption of fanciful things around -- as a matter of fact dissipates this orderly state of memory (mind) (it is, rather than pumping energy in, pouring energy out): disordered, unjust, "foolish" (un-wise), and un-precious because it is so easy to attain -- actually, like the rolling downward of the ball from the top of the hill, this is the natural progression of things, the arrow of time, so that one doesn't even have to try to attain it: we all know that we tend to forget what we learned from college -- these precious knowledges of biology, math, and physics representing orderly states of mind -- as time passes unless we continually refresh (restore) our knowledge, brush up on the material, i.e. pump energy into it; otherwise the precious, orderly state of mind dissipates. This is the experience which underlies the experience of the "soul's reaching equilibrium with the material body and dissipating" and so the disdain the salvational traditions universally show toward indulgence in sensory and bodily pleasures ("whoring and drinking") once they have objectified this experience of the entropic dissipation of memory through playing and non-studying: the learned state of mind objectively as the non-wandering (a-planetonicity) of the soul. (A contemporary football player's refraining from sexual intercourse the night before the game in order to concentrate his body -- to not let its order dissipate through sexual indulgence -- constitutes thus already a simple instance of "asceticism.") A difference among the salvation traditions is that the first mode (especially the modern, Protestant branches of Christianity) achieves such a-planetonicity through simple-minded moral percepts (e.g. the ten commandments) in accordance with its low level of intellectual and spiritual development consequent upon its remaining within the bounds of myth; while the second mode usually through learning, philosophic reflection, and finally, as with, e.g. Zhuangzi, the enlargement of the limited, partial, and personal perspective to the universal and impartial perspective ("of Heaven", of Dao) from which to look at human affairs and nature. The difference in minor salvation of the first from the second mode is most exemplified in the case of the early Protestant sects, whose "intraworldly asceticism" or work-ethic constitutes in fact their minor salvation. Max Weber, in "Askese & kapitalistischer Geist" of The Protestant Ethic, points out (the greatest Puritan thinker) Richard Baxter's antagonism toward the acquisition of riches as ethically and salvationally suspect; and yet how is it that such attitude becomes a work ethic so conducive to the growth of capitalism? "Das sittlich wirklich Verwerfliche ist naemlich das Ausruhen auf dem Besitz, der Genuss des Reichtums mit seiner Konsequenz von Muessigkeit und Fleischeslust, vor allem von Ablenkung von dem Streben nach 'heiligem' Leben. Und nur weil der Besitz die Gefahr dieses Ausruhens mit sich bringt, ist er bedenklich." ("The real morally objectionable is the relaxation in the security of possession, the enjoyment of wealth with the consequence of idleness and the temptation of the flesh, above all of the distraction from the pursuit of 'holy' life. And only because the possession [of wealth] brings with it the danger of this relaxation is it [ethically] suspect." Religionssoziologie, p. 166 - 7) Here too the fear is for the order of the soul (the salvational state of the soul) to dissipate ("to wander") through indulgence in sensory pleasures; minor salvation -- keeping the soul in order, not wandering (a-planeton) is the general meaning of asceticism. "Denn die 'ewige Ruhe der Heiligen' liegt im Jenseits, auf Erden aber muss auch der Mensch, um seines Gnadenstands sicher zu werden, 'wirken die Werke dessen, der ihn gesandt hat, solange es Tag ist.'" (p. 167; "For the 'Saints' everlasting rest' lies in the otherworld, but on earth the man must -- in order to be sure of his state of grace [i.e. his pre-destined election for salvation] -- 'do the works of Him who has sent him, as long as it is yet day.'") Here with the Puritans, though "energy pouring out" (order of the mind/ soul being dissipated) is still dispersion among comforts and pleasures, "energy is being pumped in" -- the order of the soul is maintained -- not through the contemplative study of the structure of reality (eidos), but rather through everyday, "professional" activities ("work"). Hence the Puritan horror for idleness, since the order of the soul or its a-planetonicity (minor salvation) is the index of the pre-destined election for salvation (major salvation). "Zeitvergeudung ist also die erste und prinzipiell schwerste aller Suenden... Zeitverlust durch Geselligkeit, 'faules Gerede', Luxus, selbst durch mehr als der Gesundheit noetigen Schlaf -- 6 bis hoechstens 8 Stunden -- ist sittlich absolut verwerflich." (Ibid.; "Waste of time is thus the first and in principle the greatest of all sins... Time-loss through socialization, 'idle talk', luxury, even sleep more than is necessary for health -- 6 to at most 8 hours -- is ethically absolutely objectionable.") The need to maintain the soul in order through external robotic activities was what made the Puritans so disciplined (working like a machine) as to build up quickly the capitalistic iron-cage machine which is now larger than, and so beyond the control of, but rather controls, its creators. The Puritans would evidently consider "studying" (philosophizing) as also waste of time since they can only notice the "external". As said, the most important cultural factor responsible for the rise of Protestantism was the shift of European consciousness toward empiricism or (e.g. logical) positivism where the referentiality of language had suddenly to be grounded in tangible empirical realities observable, confirmable, and agreeable by all; thence the order of the soul (the goal of asceticism) had to be grounded in ("proved by") external, objective signs observable and confirmable by everyone: outward behavior as indication of inner order and outward activities as "pumping energy in", not inner meditation or contemplation on the structure of reality which no one can see. Although the notion of predestination has all but disintegrated, today the Protestants still use outward orderly behavior and activities (doing well at one's job, sleeping and waking up early, a clean house, behavioral obedience to the "ten commandments" and not "fornicating") to maintain inner order. No doubt the appeal of this is that it is "easy" (no intelligence required, unlike philosophizing; but just robotic routine) and "objective": well suited to the shallow people populating the first mode who usually don't have the brain-power to achieve (true!) minor salvation through knowledge, wisdom, and the enlightened state of mind.²

This thermodynamic origin of the causal relationship between asceticism (minor salvation) and eternal (major) salvation illuminates much of Plato's ideas about salvation through eidetic study and the reincarnation cycle resulting from the lack of such study. Socrates continues to elaborate: Injustice (disorder) in the soul results from the rule of the body over the soul rather than the other (proper) way around. Since the soul is most similar to the divine, immortal, "intelligible" (mind-like, nohtwi), uni-form (monoeidei), indissoluable (adialutwi: the most concentrated order in the whole cosmos), being-always-in-the-same-manner-according-to-itself-in-relation-to-itself (aei wsautwV kata tauta econti eautwi), it is the divine, and the divine (as soul) is by nature to rule and lead and the mortal (as body) to be ruled and serve (h ou dokei soi to men qeion oion arcein te kai hgemoneuein pefukenai, to de qnhton arcesqai te kai douleuein: 80 4-5.). Injustice therefore has the more remote cause in the perversion of natural functions (which causes the fascination with the empirical and the wandering), a theme that will become important in the Republic.

An unjust soul, which, during life, "has loved and cared (qerapeuousa, erwsa) for the body, and... been bewitched by its desires and pleasures (epiqumiwn, hdonwn), so that it thinks nothing else true except the corporeal form (wste mhden allo dokein einai alhqeV all'h to swmatoeideV), i.e. what can be touched, seen, drunk, eaten, and used for sexual enjoyment (ou tiV an... proV ta afrodisia crhsaito); but which has been accustomed to hate and tremble before and flee what is obscure and invisible to the eyes but intelligible (mind-wise) and graspable by philosophy" (nohton de kai filosofiai aireton) -- such soul, upon departure, is not by itself or itself according to itself (authn kaq'authn: i.e. in the original "concentrated" form), but "seized in its midst" or interspersed within with corporeal elements (dielhmmenhn upo tou swmatoeidouV), becomes heavy, earthy, and visible, is dragged (by its weight) back to the visible region (the empirical world) through the fear of Hades and the invisible (fobwi tou aidouV te kai Aidou). (81 c.) That is, it has partially reached equilibrium with the body. Such souls become ghosts, shadowy phantoms of souls (yucwn skioeidh fantasmata). This whole discussion by Socrates of the soul being heavy and the following one on the patterns of reincarnation is permeated by "eikoV", "likely", and "panu men oun eikoV legeiV", "and [what] you say [is] very likely", which shows that he is thinking that something like this is true, it is a "likely scenario", a hypothesis, a mythical, metaphorical approximation. But something like this has to be true, because of the surety of the experience of thermodynamics. The exact detail of truth is however not yet known. For now it is just necessary to understand that Plato is trying to express in mythic terms and in the functional perspective the (thermodynamic) experience of order-non-wandering and disorder-dispersion-dissolution. Had he grown up today and been educated in modern sciences and the structural perspective, he would have expressed this thermodynamic experience of order in terms other than spirits, ghosts, and reincarnation (below), but rather in terms of the following scientific enlightenment.

The aetiological concern with Fate. Fate is justice (the restoration to equilibrium). For Plato, fate is no longer assigned by god as lot (which is still according to justice, i.e. to restore equilibrium) but the result of a man's own action; such is Plato's advance from mythic consciousness. Though the idea of justice remains constant from myth to philosophy (always the return to equilibrium), it has become now less of gods' "getting even" but more of the impersonal natural consequences of a man's rational actions. This will become, yet again, a dominant theme in the Republic.

Thus the unjust souls "pay penalty [dike] for their former evil nurture [nourishment]" (anagkazontai... dikhn tinousai thV proteraV trofhV kakhV oushV: 81 d 8) and wander, reincarnate (i.e. being again imprisoned/ bound in a body: palin endeqwsin eiV swma) -- in consequence of its impurity, i.e. of its weakened stabilization away from equilibrium -- in the type of character or disposition (hqh) that they have cultivated in their life time. E.g. the souls of the gluttonous, hubris, alcoholic (love-drinking, philoposias), in ass or such animals; of the unjust, tyrannous, and robbers, in wolves, hawks, etc. The happiest (eudaimonestatoi) of the reincarnates are the popularly regarded just and wise (in the sense of temperant) persons, those who have practiced popular and social goodness (oi thn dhmotikhn kai politikhn arethn epitethdeukoteV) but only out of disposition and training (ex eqouV te kai melethV) without understanding the substance of justice (of the well-ordered soul, or rather the substance of orderliness), i.e. without philosophy and "intelligence" (nous). They are to reincarnate into tame and social/ political (politiken) creatures like bees or ants -- recall Haeckel's comment on the "republican" form of the colony of ants -- and then back into human race, to be born as descent or average man (andraV metriouV: averaged, measured man).

Only the souls of the philosophers, who have during life utterly refrained from the body and purified their soul -- stabilized it away from equilibrium in the purest, most concentrated form -- are to be conserved in eternal conservedness. The philosophers are saved, because they did not during life practice justice (orderly life) simply habitually like a robot programmed to behave thusly, but with the understanding of its substance, its form.

There seems implicitly to be an Anaximandrean idea of justice here, which, of course, is like karma. The hedonistic pleasures enjoyed by the soul in human forms are presumably the maximal among living beings -- an animal that gives itself to the satisfaction of gluttonous and sexual needs presumably does not derive as much pleasures from such satisfaction as would a human being doing the same. These pleasures should therefore be balanced by the idiotic pleasures in the idiotic existence of an ass. Animal desires and pleasures are equivalent recompenses or rather retributions for human desires and pleasures of the same type. The unconsciously good man (the justice of the Old Generation in the Republic) is complete equivalent to himself and so retributed or recompensed by the same (at least eventually, first passing through the unconsciousness of the ants as presumably retribution for the unconsciousness of the habitual good man). Socrates seems to be certain of the "amount" of recompense or retribution, but is not sure of the "form" in which the "amount" is to be retributed; hence the reincarnation scenario is only "likely" (eikos).

Reincarnation is retribution for ignorance or non-philosophy; only a philosophic existence is not retributed and so it is rewarded with eternal conservation after life.

Note the intimate connection here between justice and philosophy (as the investigation into the [divine] structure of reality). The ultimate goal of philosophy is salvation of the soul after life; but its immediate effect in this life is justice or orderliness, which, from the well-ordered soul of the philosopher, characterized by the rule of the soul over the body, can pass into the well-ordered polis, characterized by oikeopragia or "each to his or her own business" and the rule by the one who should rule, i.e. the philosophically oriented person with a soul well ordered by the contemplation on the divine, "things according to themselves" and ultimately That according to itself, i.e. the Good (agathon). This is the meaning of the right order of the polis as the right order of the soul written large, because the structure of order, orderliness, is all the same, whether it be embodied in a person or in a social collective. Plato here remains within the macrocosmo-microcosmic concentricism of the functional perspective.

In this way justice -- the right order of existence in the temporal world governed and terribly effected by the second law of thermodynamics -- disengages from metaphysics/ philosophy -- the search for the truth of existence. This disengagement will be the task of the Republic, with metaphysics of Being as its center (literally the middle of the book) from which justice disengages.

Plato therefore closely parallels down to the last detail of his spirit the Confucianism in the Far East at around the same time in history.

It is also here that the perennial theme of philosophy as disengagement from the illusions imposed by the bodily bounding of perception establishes itself. Viewing through the body, inquiry through the senses, bound and glued to the body which causes being bound to empirical reality which is planaton (wandering), is the meaning of illusion. "[The soul] forced to view things [beings] as if through a prison, rather than itself through itself, and wallowing [rolled up] in ignorance [amathiai]" (anagkazomenhn de wsper dia eirgmou [prison] dia toutou [i.e. the body] skopeisqai ta onta alla mh authn di'authn, kai en pashi amaqiai kulindoumenhn); "the cunning of prison [tou eirgmou thn deinothta: terribleness, cleverness]... effected through desire [epithumia]", "so that the captive himself is the partner of [in effecting] his imprisonment" (wV an malista autoV o dedemenoV sullhptwr eih tou dedesqai; 82 e.) Only what the soul sees alone by itself is real: "whenever, itself according to itself, it thinks [minds: noesei] -- of being -- being itself according to itself" (oti an nohshi auth kaq'authn auto kaq'auto twn ontwn. 83 b.) which is "the intelligible and invisible" (nohton te kai aideV: 83 b 4). The illusion imposed by the operations of the second law of thermodynamics thus is two fold: First of all, the second law imposes existence in space-time, which is illusion, not real, and all things existent in space-time (the temporal and spatial things) are not real. Secondly, the second law forces us to collaborate in the perpetuation of our illusion, by binding us so inextricably to our body, to the satisfaction of our bodily desires, to the fulfillment of the material meaning of our life -- consumption, defecation, and reproduction to continue the cycle anew of consumption and defecation -- and this binding is what ties our attention solely to the temporal-spatial things which are not real. That things existing in space and time are not real is defined here by Plato as planaton and thereby lacking, wanting, or falling short (endei) of the eternal reality (of the "forms") -- the reality itself according to itself -- which, while not captured by the temporal reality, nevertheless is the ground, foundation, or the condition of possibility for this empirical wandering reality. In our discussion of the parallels between philosophy and modern physics we will see the deeper significance -- i.e. scientific or structural meaning -- of the illusory nature of temporal and spatial existence and the truthfulness of eternal existence.

Socrates describes the perpetuation of illusion through the binding of our attention to the temporal things: "It is that the soul of every human being, when intensely pleased or pained at something, is forced at the same time to suppose that whatever most affects [paschei] it in this way is most clear [enargestaton] and most real [true: alethestaton], when it is not so; and such objects especially are things seen [horata], aren't they?" (83 c 5.) This is taking (opining) "for real [alethe] whatever the body declares it to be." (doxazousan tauta alhqh einai aper an kai to swma fhi. 83 d 6.) This is illusion and the objects of illusion -- the temporal and spatial things -- are called "the opined", to doxaston, objects of opinion, and the real, the true things are to adoxaston, the "a-opined". (This continues the use of doxa since Parmenides and Empedocles.)

Thus are further identified one with the other illusions and the dispersion of the soul, and then truth (knowledge of the true structure of reality) and the a-planetonicity (concentrated, pure, salvational state) of the soul, the two identifications which are the hallmarks of the second mode of salvation.

Footnotes:

1. For the text of Phaedo I use the one edited by C. J. Rowe, Cambridge University Press, 1993. The English translation used here is the one by David Gallop, Oxford University Press, 1993. I alter his translation whenever I deem it fit.

2. This continues from the contrast between the first and the second mode of salvation as laid out in the Synopsis (see Table). Weber himself calls the Protestant type of asceticism the "active" type ("ein gottgewolltes Handeln als Werkzeug Gottes einerseits"; "a doing wanted by God and [oneself] as the instrument of God") and the "mind-based" asceticism of the second mode the "having" type ("der kontemplative Heilsbesitz der Mystik, der ein 'Haben', nicht ein Handeln bedeuten will, und bei welchem der Einzelne nicht Werkzeug, sondern 'Gefaess' des Goettlichen ist, das Handeln in der Welt mithin als Gefaehrdung der durchaus irrationalen und ausserweltlichen Heilszustaendlichkeit erscheinen muss"; "the contemplative salvation-possession of the mystic, which means 'having', and not 'doing,' and in which one is not the instrument, but the container, of the divine, and doing in the world therewith must appear as endangering the thoroughly irrational and otherworldly salvational state"; ibid., p. 538 - 9). Weber, it seems, does not notice that the "active" type is really just the degeneration from the "contemplative" type through externalization of the latter: his classification puts the two types on equal footing. Secondly, as the Platonic asceticism consists in the rational contemplation on forms, Weber's characterization of the 'having' type as irrational -- applicable, it seems, mostly to the Christian mystics (c.f. also p. 540) -- is simply wrong.